


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13 June 1985



USSR Report

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13 June 1985

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LT GEN ZHILIN: MORE ABOUT FALSIFIERS OF HISTORY

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English Vol 31 No 81, 25 Apr 85 Part II

[Article by Lieutenant-General P. Zhilin, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Lenin Prize winner]

[Text]

Reviewing the outcome of the Second World War in the light of the developments of the intervening four decades, we find over and over again that many of them have taken shape under the impact of our Victory over fascism.

Not everybody, however, looks at the outcome and lessons of the Second World War in the same way. There is a lot of difference in the assessment of its causes, character and results.

In fact, this is understandable. The consequences of the major battles proved to be a far cry from what the capitalist rulers of the West had expected them to be. The world became different after the war. The collapse of fascism was not only the defeat of Hitler Germany but also the total frustration of the hopes of international reaction for the destruction of the Socialist state.

However, imperialism is not giving up its intention to take revenge and to deal a counter strike at Socialism. It is using all means to this end, including those of ideological warfare. That is why the problems of war history are uncommonly dramatic in our time. The main concern of Western ideologues is to erase from the peoples' memories the truth about those who had engineered the war and about those who won the Great Victory.

Bourgeois historiography has been at pains to misrepresent the causes behind the outbreak of the war.

One argument that has been advanced in order to acquit imperialism is that the only man responsible for the war was Hitler. It has been around for quite a long time. The reason why it has proved so hard to die is that this is yet another attempt to justify German monopolies and the political and military leaders of the Third Reich who are said to have fallen victim to the Fuehrer's "ill will". However, a study of the policies of German imperialism and Nazism shows that there was a close, indeed, integral connection between them and the war.

Bourgeois propaganda has been deliberately misrepresenting the pre-war policy of the Soviet Union, attempting to picture it as a "military threat" to the nations of Western Europe. In reality, this country did whatever it could to save Europe by peaceful means from the growing threat of war. But the capitalist world remained deaf to the Soviet proposals. The governments of the US, Britain and France pursued a policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor and in every way encouraged his war preparations they hoped to direct the main strike against the Soviet Union.

In those most involved circumstances, our country was forced to accept Germany's offer of a non-aggression pact. In that way, the USSR succeeded in prolonging the time of peace which was used to strengthen its security.

Yet another clear example of falsification is the version about the "preventive character" of Hitler Germany's war against the USSR. Its essential argument is that the war was launched against the USSR to forestall its attack on Germany and that by starting the war against the USSR Hitler wanted to save Western Europe from the "Bolshevik military threat".

That allegation was contained in the memorandum which Germany's Foreign Minister Ribbentrop handed to the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin on June 22, 1941, after the German invasion

had already begun.

This fake story is still widely circulated in the West. Facts, however, disprove that lie of Western historians. The Soviet Union never had any territorial claims, nor does it have any. As to fascist Germany, she had begun to prepare for war against our country right after the Nazi takeover. Her designs were translated into the Barbarossa plan which was endorsed by Hitler on December 18, 1940.

The falsifiers are at pains, furthermore, to play down the Soviet Union's role in the Victory over fascist Germany and militarist Japan. Along with that, they are inordinately overstating the role of the Western allies, the US, first and foremost. That the Second World War was a major coalition war is common knowledge. It has been unequalled in terms of magnitude and intensity. That mammoth battle of nations drew in 61 States, three-quarters of the world's population. There were upwards of 110 million men under arms in those days, and fighting went on in all theatres of hostilities, on the ground, at sea and in the air.

I must note that Soviet historiography has always given its due to the contribution which the armies of the US, Britain, France, China and other anti-Hitler coalition nations made towards bringing about the Victory.

But a scientific analysis of the history of the war incontrovertibly proves that the Soviet-German Front was the main and decisive one. It was there that the bulk of the fascist German army was concentrated and all major overland battles fought out. It was there that Hitler Germany lost three-quarters of her manpower and hardware.

Western politicians and historians have been trying to falsify the closing episodes of the war in order, above all, to misrepresent the sum and substance of the great liberatory mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. The tune has been called by US leaders. In a number of statements, President Reagan, Vice-

President Bush and Secretary of Defence Weinberger have presented the Soviet Army's liberatory mission as "expansion" and "aggression", and the Yalta and Potsdam agreements establishing the post-war arrangement of Europe as "mistakes" of the West. But the story about Socialism having been brought into European countries by "Soviet bayonets" has been proved to be sheer slander.

Our ideological opponents insist on revising the post-war set-up in Europe and redrawing the post-war frontiers. All that emboldens West-German revenge-seekers. Surviving Nazis and their followers and all kinds of "brotherhoods" have been rearing their head in West Germany under the Bundestag's wing.

Bourgeois ideologues are going out of their way to propagate a wrong idea of the sources of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The aim of those insinuations is to withhold the true factors of our Victory from the younger generation. The USSR realised three main objectives while still fighting fascist Germany single-handed. The Soviet Union and its Armed Forces barred the way to the fascist aggression; they knocked out the bulk of the enemy's troops and military hardware, and brought off the defeat of the aggressors and so lent major assistance to the peoples of Europe and Asia in saving them from physical destruction.

There is a fair popular saying: great things are seen from afar. Nothing can obscure or belittle the history-making Great Victory of the Soviet Union.

(Izvestia, April 24. Abridged.)

CSO: 1812/228

WARSAW PACT

ARMY GEN GRIBKOV WRITES ON WARSAW PACT ANNIVERSARY

PM151135 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 85 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Army General A. Gribkov, chief of staff and first deputy commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, under the rubric "On the 30th Anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization": "Watching Over Peace and Socialism"]

[Text] It is highly symbolic that the 30th anniversary of the military-political defensive alliance of the socialist community countries--the Warsaw Pact--coincides with the 40th anniversary of our great victory.

The military cooperation among the fraternal peoples and armies, which was established during World War II, has successfully withstood the test of time, grown strong, and further developed during the postwar years. It took on tangible form in the Warsaw Pact Organization, which watches vigilantly over peace.

The uniting of the socialist states in a defensive and political alliance was a measure forced on them in response to the intensification of the threat from the military-political bloc of capitalist countries--the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO)--which was formed in April 1949. Its aggressive nature was manifested in the elaboration by the United States in the late forties and the fifties of a whole series of plans for a nuclear attack on the USSR and the other socialist countries, in the unleashing of the arms race, in the large-scale deliveries of American hardware and armaments to West European states, in the steep growth in the numerical strength of their armed forces, and in the creation of a system of military bases near our borders. The FRG's joining of NATO in 1955 constituted a particular danger.

The conclusion of the Warsaw Pact took place only after the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries had in effect exhausted all the possibilities of eliminating the danger of a new war and preventing the division of Europe. And this measure was not adopted until 6 years after the creation of NATO.

In terms of objectives, the Warsaw Pact Organization is a new type of alliance of states. It is the first multilateral treaty in mankind's history to subordinate its activity to the interests of preserving and strengthening peace. In this respect it differs radically from the capitalist states' alliances and blocs. The Warsaw Pact is of an exclusively defensive nature. Its members do not threaten anyone, they are not about to attack anyone, and they lay no claim to other people's territories.

The Warsaw Pact also differs in principle from imperialism's military blocs by virtue of the nature of mutual relations between its participants. Collaboration between the Warsaw Pact countries is built on the principles of friendship and all-around cooperation, fraternal mutual assistance, collective responsibility for socialism's future and the defense of its gains, equality and respect, independence, and sovereignty. One important aspect of our alliance is that it accords fully with the aims and principles of the United Nations and the letter and spirit of the UN Charter.

The structure of the Warsaw Pact Organization also accords with its peace-loving nature. The supreme organ is the Political Consultative Committee (PCC). At its conferences, in which the leaders of the fraternal parties and countries participate, opinions are exchanged and the community's foreign policy efforts are coordinated. An important component in the machinery of cooperation and coordination of actions in international affairs is the Foreign Ministers Committee. Many initiatives put forward by the PCC have formed the basis of decisions by major international forums or have been reflected in a number of interstate acts.

The coordinated actions of the Warsaw Pact members were decisive in promoting the retreat of the "cold war" unleashed by the imperialist states and the consolidation of the political results of the war and postwar developments as a whole. As a result of this it was possible to achieve the recognition of the GDR in international law and the inviolability of borders between the FRG and the GDR and between Poland and the CSSR. Our countries played a leading role in preparing and holding the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which ended with the signing in August 1975 of the Final Act--a long-term program of cooperation between states.

As is known, one of the main avenues of the fraternal countries' foreign policy activity throughout the last three decades has been the struggle to end the arms race. A major success was achieved in this sphere in 1963, when the nuclear powers signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water. They also made a considerable contribution to the elaboration of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), to which 115 states became parties. In 1972 the USSR and the United States signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I). In 1974, on the initiative of the USSR and its allies, the U.S.-USSR Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests was signed. Another important act was the signing of the SALT II Treaty between the USSR and the United States in Vienna in June 1979. But this was not ratified by Washington.

Guided by the decisions of the Warsaw PCC Conference (May 1980), the USSR, together with its allies, submitted for examination by the UN General Assembly session a series of important proposals aimed at preserving and strengthening peace, which received the approval of the majority of UN member states. Then the Soviet Union put forward a proposal that agreement be reached on the complete renunciation by NATO and the Warsaw Pact of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and also proposed that this region be free of any nuclear weapons. An act of historic significance was the USSR's statement on its unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

A package of concrete measures to preserve detente, strengthen peace, and end the arms race was set forth in the Political Declaration adopted by the Prague PCC Conference in January 1983. It also contains an appeal to the NATO bloc states to conclude a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and on maintaining relations of peace. A number of constructive proposals were submitted by the Warsaw Pact countries for examination at the Stockholm conference, which opened in 1984. Its resumption at the beginning of this year was marked by an important initiative from the Soviet Union, which submitted far-reaching proposals aimed at lessening the threat of war.

The world's attention is now focused on the Soviet-American talks on space and nuclear arms which are taking place in Geneva on the initiative of the USSR, supported by the fraternal countries. As a show of good will, the Soviet Union has imposed a moratorium, until November of this year, on the deployment of its medium-range missiles, and has halted the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe.

However, Western reactionary circles are still gambling on force and on the attainment of military superiority. In the United States, all types of offensive arms are being built up at an accelerated rate, and space militarization plans are being elaborated. They are trying to call into question the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and the territorial and political realities which came into being in Europe after the war.

In the current complex international situation, the Warsaw Pact countries combine the consistent implementation of their peace-loving policy with readiness to rebuff possible aggression. They devote due attention to the strengthening of their defense capability and to building and training the Joint Armed Forces which were created under the Pact and to which each country assigns contingents of its troops and fleets. The troops assigned to the Joint Armed Forces still remain subordinate to the national defense ministries, which are responsible to their countries' leadership for their state, equipment, combat readiness, training, and political and military education of personnel. The activity of the contingents of troops and fleets is governed by the laws in force in the allied countries and by statutes and military regulations. In this way the principles of the equality of every allied country are implemented.

The Joint Armed Forces include formations and units of the ground forces, the air defense forces, the air force, and the navy. Over the last 30 years they have come a long way in terms of all-around qualitative development. Thanks to the constant concern of the fraternal parties and governments of the allied countries, they are equipped with modern armaments and sophisticated means of control, and meet the highest demands. The organizational structure of formations and units has improved. The operational and combat training of staffs, troops, and naval forces has improved as has the material and technical backup. Formations, units, and ships are staffed with trained personnel who have a good mastery of modern weapons and hardware and are boundlessly devoted to their patriotic and international duty. The Joint Armed Forces' level of combat readiness is in accordance with the defensive objectives and tasks which they face.

The practical coordination of defense measures is carried out by the military organs set up by the Warsaw Pact countries: The Defense Ministers Committee, the Joint Command, the Military Council, the Staff, and the Technical Committee for the Joint Armed Forces. They coordinate in implementing the PCC's decisions on the collective strengthening of the fraternal countries' defense capability.

The national people's armies, whose creation began during World War II with the Soviet Union's assistance, have increased their strength and fire power over the years. The formation of the Tadeusz Kosciuszko 1st Polish Infantry Division near Ryazan in 1943 marked the start of the creation of the Polish People's Army. The Czechoslovak People's Army traces its pedigree back to the first separate Czechoslovak battalion, formed in the city of Buzuluk at the beginning of 1943. The army of the Socialist Republic of Romania was created in the course of socialist building. It includes the Tudor Vladimirescu Division, formed from volunteers on the USSR's territory in 1943. Bulgaria's old army was also reorganized in the light of the conditions which emerged as a result of the September revolution of 1944. A large proportion of the partisans and communist volunteers were directed into its ranks. On the basis of the Budayskiy Volunteer Regiment, created in February 1945 from Hungarian servicemen who had gone over to the Soviet troops' side, the First Infantry Division of the New Hungarian Army was formed. The GDR National People's Army is the youngest of the harmonious family of fraternal armies.

Thanks to their unity of view, united efforts, and utilization of the Soviet Armed Forces' rich experience, the national people's armies have undergone considerable transformations. They now fully meet modern requirements.

Great attention is also devoted to preparing the allied troops and naval forces for joint operations in the event of an attack by an aggressor. This work takes place through both the joint command and the national commands. It includes joint exercises and training sessions, training methodology conferences and meetings of leadership personnel of the allied armies, and certain other measures.

A particularly important role is played by the large-scale comprehensive exercises held within the framework of the Joint Armed Forces. At these exercises questions of troop control and collaboration among the staffs of

the allied armies and fleets in the course of joint operations are rehearsed. Each army seeks to make its contribution to increasing their effectiveness. The Shield-84 exercise, held in early fall 1984, was characteristic in this respect.

The servicemen of a Bulgarian People's Army Regiment commanded by Major D. Stoyanov were the first to go into "battle." The Bulgarian tankmen were supported by Czechoslovak airmen. Strikes by "enemy" aircraft were rebuffed by air defense subunits of the Czechoslovak People's Army. The Bulgarian tankmen's actions created favorable conditions for the success to be developed by subunits of a Soviet tank regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kovalenko and the Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Otakar Jaros Sokolovsko-Belotserkovskiy Tank Regiment--a leading regiment of the Czechoslovak People's Army, headed by Major M. Korman. The fulfillment of the joint combat training task rallied the tankmen still more firmly together. The exercise showed the enhanced level of operational and tactical preparation of the staffs and the field and air training of the troops and confirmed the combat readiness of the Warsaw Pact countries' armed forces to defend their peoples' revolutionary gains.

At one exercise on Polish territory, exercises were carried out by Polish motorized infantry men, tankmen and artillerymen from the GDR National People's Army, and Soviet engineering subunits. The Polish, German, and Soviet servicemen helped each other to repair machinery, refuel tanks and infantry combat vehicles, and supply food and water. Together they set up entrenchments for the tanks and guns and shelters for the people. As a reminder of their stay on Polish soil, the servicemen built a bridge across the river for the residents of one village. In another village they helped repair agricultural machinery.

Other measures also promote the international education of servicemen. For instance, in the Bulgarian People's Army it is customary to give military units the title "combat friendship regiment." At present there are regiments of Bulgarian-Soviet, Bulgarian-Hungarian, and Bulgarian-Czechoslovak friendship.

The activity of political organs is of great significance in strengthening international contacts between the allied armies. They educate personnel in the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism, in the spirit of class hatred for imperialism and intolerance toward bourgeois ideology.

The historical path traveled over the 30 years by the Warsaw Pact Organization and the objectives and tasks facing the Joint Armed Forces are convincing evidence that our alliance reliably serves the development and strengthening of all-around cooperation and the safeguarding of security and the inviolability of borders and plays a very important part in the cause of preserving and strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world.

As was stressed at the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum, the fraternal socialist countries are united in the opinion that "the Warsaw Pact Organization must continue, while the NATO bloc exists, to play an

important role in defending socialism's positions in Europe and the world and act as a reliable instrument for preventing nuclear war and strengthening international security."

The fraternal countries demonstrated their resolve to continue to fight to remove the threat of nuclear war from the world and bring the international community back onto the path of detente and cooperation at the meeting of top party and state figures from the Warsaw Pact states which was held in Warsaw at the end of last month, when the Pact was extended for a further term.

The main result of the Warsaw Pact's activity is that the peoples of the member countries and the peoples of Europe are living in peace. The military-political alliance of brother peoples is the reliable guardian of their security.

CSO: 1801/223

WARSAW PACT

MOSCOW TV FEATURE ON HISTORY OF WARSAW PACT

[LD161024 Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 14 May 1985 broadcasts a 50-minute video report marking the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact. Presented by an identified [unidentified?] narrator, the feature is entitled, "The Reliable Shield of Socialism."

Over a video clip showing the recently concluded ceremony at which the "Warsaw Pact's validity was extended, in which Zhivkov, Kadar, Honecker, Stoph, Hoffman, Jaruzelski, Czyrek, Ceausescu, Gorbachev, Gromyko and Husak are shown in that order, the narrator states: "On the eve of the 40th anniversary of victory the top party and state leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries, meeting here in the capital of the Polish People's Republic, issued a confident and authoritative declaration of the invariability of the Leninist peace policy being pursued by the alliance of the socialist countries, on the vital need for the Warsaw Pact to strengthen peace and peoples' security. We are rightly proud of the great victory which we achieved at such cost during the last war. We will always be proud of it. Today people clearly realize that the subsequent decades of peace were secured for the peoples of the socialist countries and other European states by the Warsaw Pact, the great alliance of equal states without precedent in history."

As video shows various training scenes, such as soldiers in different uniforms marching; at least four MI-24 helicopter gunships taking off; a T-72 tank performing a circular maneuver; a group of soldiers scaling a blazing fence; a soldier adjusting the controls of a BM-21 Katyusha Multiple Rocket Launcher; two helmeted soldiers tackling an assault course; three or four fully dressed soldiers swimming with their packs in front of them; a brief glimpse of the interior of what might be a tank; and cadets in Soviet and other uniforms undergoing Morse Code instruction, the instructor continues: "by defending peace on his own soil and soldiers of the Warsaw Pact, the son of a peasant or a worker, is defending socialism. Proletarian, socialist internationalism is an immutable principle of the Warsaw Pact. For 30 years the soldiers and officers of the joint forces have been honorably carrying out their patriotic and internationalist duty, the defense of the frontiers of socialism."

Turning to current disarmament initiatives, the narrator says: "During the past 30 years the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, have put forward over 100 proposals aimed at disarmament. The USSR and the socialist countries are persistently making proposals to the West for constructive measures to heal the international situation and to ease tension in the world." As the camera shows pact delegations meeting in a large hall, showing in turn Zhivkov, Kadar, Honecker, Jaruzelski and Czyrek, Ceausescu, Tikhonov, Andropov and Gromyko, and Husak, Kulikov and Gribkov, the commentator resumes: "This is a session of the political consultative committee, the supreme political body of the Warsaw Pact. The political consultative committee is a most important center for the drafting and coordination of the foreign policy of the allied states and their policy in the sphere of strengthening defense capability. In January 1983 the Prague meeting of the supreme political body of the Warsaw Pact put forward the following initiative: It proposed that the member-states of the North Atlantic Bloc and the member-states of the Warsaw Pact should conclude a treaty on mutual renunciation of military force and on maintenance of peaceful relations. The declaration adopted at the conference stressed that a policy based on the unleashing of nuclear war and winning victory in it is reckless. All the nuclear powers were asked to follow the example of the Soviet Union and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The participants in the Prague conference of the Political Consultative Committee called for the complete scrapping of nuclear weapons in Europe. The committee of foreign ministers makes a big contribution to the implementation of the joint international course of the socialist countries. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries are following the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence, which stems from our system and our world outlook. Public opinion in the socialist countries warmly supports the peaceful initiatives put forward by the Warsaw Pact.

Turning to previous disarmament conferences, the narrator continues: "The All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in Helsinki in 1975. It took persistent striving on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries and other peace-loving forces to bring about the convening of this conference. The conference was a major landmark in the history of Europe. The final act of the conference outlined 10 principles of peaceful coexistence. Renunciation of force, inviolability of post-war frontiers, territorial integrity of states and non-interference in each other's internal affairs were the most important of these principles. In the period since Helsinki, during which the enemies of peace have tried to revise to uphold peace. The Soviet Union persistently puts forward peace initiatives in order to create a climate of trust between states."

After recalling recent U.S. military actions in various parts of the world, such as setting up the RDF, the invasion of Grenada, shelling in Lebanon, and Vietnam, the presenter continues: "The world cannot forget the fact that U.S. soldiers learned to kill people even before Vietnam. The escalation of intimidation was adopted as a strategy by the pentagon long ago. Let us recall what happened to Dresden in 1945." As an archive film shows a devastated city, fountains in a close-up of damaged sculpture, and a view of the rebuilt semper oper, the presenter continues: "When the war was

already ending and tens of thousands of refugees were flooding into the city, U.S. and British bombers dropped thousands of bombs on their heads. This was the planned destruction of civilians and intimidation of the USSR. The Austrian newspaper VOLKSSTIMME was to write later: "The monstrous attacks on Dresden and Hiroshima had the same objective, to intimidate the Soviet Union." The city, which rose again from ashes, remembers this act of total bombing. It does not allow visitors to Dresden to forget, so that other generations also remember what happened."

Discussing the current status of the pact, the announcer says: "The soldiers of the socialist countries are soldiers of a new type. As well as saving children in peacetime, they are prepared to come to the defense of peace itself when times are harsh. That is their external duty on earth--to defend peace and mankind for as long as the danger of war exists and for as long as the NATO bloc arms itself."

As the camera shows UK Prime Minister Thatcher inspecting bombs at an armaments exhibition, the announcer says:

"Ignoring the peace proposals of the socialist community and common sense itself, the West continues to think of weapons. Thousands of talented engineers are employed on the design of armaments. The military designers have made the weapons look elegant. They look beautiful and quite harmless on the display stands.["] As a U.S. B-1 bomber is rolled out for its first public display, the presenter proceeds: "but they are capable of sowing more death than any previous weapon. Huge aircraft carriers threateningly patrol the ocean expanses. They carry hundreds of planes which are ready to take off. What are the preoccupations of the staff of the North Atlantic bloc and their far-off masters on the other side of the Atlantic? They are working on very real military situations in various parts of the world."

Citing an interview of NATO Commander in Chief U.S. General Rogers, the presenter quotes him as saying: "Whether we like it or not, we will have to use nuclear weapons fairly soon." Showing a document marked "NATO Secret Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (Europe)" "SHAPE study to attack and destroy second echelon forces," and following with views of cruise missiles in flight, the presenter resumes: "and this document, although it is a secret one, is plainly a plan to attack and destroy follow-up forces. Meanwhile, cruise missile flights have already passed out of the planning stage, demonstrating contemporary policy Reagan-style."

As shots of a military patrol followed by views of a British naval officer and British soldiers in camouflage dress and berets looking at the camera, through binoculars are shown, the announcer resumes: "NATO troops are deployed near the frontiers of the socialist countries for their regular maneuvers. The GDR is the leading edge of socialism in the West. Its frontiers are guarded by soldiers who have been trained in the forces of the Warsaw Pact armies. Noting the position of the streets and squares of GDR towns, NATO strategists enter every residential area and every apartment house on their military maps. Day and night helicopters and aircraft patrol the borders of the republic."

Views of the exterior and interior of a large swept-wing aircraft in flight are shown, is followed by shot[s] of an AWACS plane in flight, shots of the television tower on Alexanderplatz in East Berlin and the Brandenburg Gate are displayed. "And flights like this one could have tragic consequences. The radar of an American aircraft, which took off with a payload of bombs and flew in the vicinity of the GDR frontier, failed. The frightened crew did not know whether they had crossed the border or not. Fortunately, no mishap occurred on this occasion. [Narrator quotation continues] Every day AWACS planes fly along the GDR frontier on a set course. The crews call it the NATO frontline. From tremendous heights their radars probe 400 km into sovereign territory. Like all other servicemen of the Warsaw Pact, the GDR's pilots watch the enemy intrigues." Video shows an interview with a German-speaking radar operator seated in a radar control room. His remarks are translated into Russian, as follows: "Day and night, from my position here, I see the provocative flights by NATO aircraft. These people's intentions are not clear. They are seeking loopholes in our system of defense. Reconnaissance flights by planes like the AWACS, the U-2 and the SR-71, have lately been carried out more and more often." The presenter continues:

"U.S. Pershings are being installed by the frontiers of the socialist camp. They are poised to turn the flourishing land into a desertlike, lunar landscape without city streets and people in them."

As the camera portrays a computer terminal showing a diagram, and equipment marked "JANUS" and "Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory," the announcer resumes: "And this electronic equipment is a means of rehearsing war options, the crushing of the adversary and the destruction of armies. Real states and the size of their forces are entered in its memory bank. The best possible options for their destruction are played through. That's the whole point of the exercise."

Lately the U.S. military-industrial complex has been preoccupied with yet another expensive game, with the stars this time. This fashionable, multi-billion dollar venture threatens to bring mankind to the brink of the abyss. The U.S. is trying to make all the NATO countries participate in the sinister militarization of space. Meanwhile, the U.S. secretary of defense simply cannot understand why the world protests against these same Star Wars.

The Soviet Union takes a different stand. Space must not become the source of a military threat. Space must be reserved exclusively for peace, for peaceful work. Never before has the anti-war movement in Europe assumed such proportions. Today both young and old people are protesting against the Pershings and the other technical novelties for the destruction of people, against the military doctrines and declarations by Western politicians. There are fewer and fewer people in the world who can be fooled by U.S. talk of peace from a position of strength. So instead of talk they start using a different argument--truncheons. But the movement of people, who want to live, to live in peace, without wars, who want their children to go peacefully to school, to play and laugh, who do not want their childhood to be interrupted by an atomic conflagration, is unstoppable.

The Warsaw Pact has been in existence for 30 years. The treaty is working effectively for peace. Army General Gribkov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty, discusses this:

[Begin Gribkov recording over video showing him delivering a talk in an office] One may regard the following as being among the most important results of the 30 years in which the Warsaw Pact organization has been active: in the political domain post-war realities in Europe have been enshrined in treaties. In the economic sphere the problem of surmounting substantial countries has been resolved. This has been promoted by their economic integration. In the military sphere, military-strategic parity with NATO has been achieved. This is the main condition for ensuring the security of the socialist states. Assessing the 30 years in which the Warsaw Pact organization has been active, one can generally say with pride that it has dependably safeguarded the security of the fraternal countries and the inviolability of their frontiers. It has helped to preserve and consolidate peace in Europe and throughout the world. [end Gribkov recording]

The strategic and tactical tasks which are being tackled by the men of the Warsaw Pact armies are aimed at defending the frontiers of the sovereign socialist states, at meeting the enemy on land and in the air, at stopping the deployment of the adversary's technical resources and at destroying anybody who encroaches on the freedom of the peoples of the socialist states. It is essential to know the equipment inside out, to know how to use it in all conditions, including the most unexpected ones. The soldiers of the Warsaw Pact are taught this during maneuvers. Cooperation between national armies and all branches of the forces is rehearsed during maneuvers and exercises. The servicemen of the Joint Armed Forces, who are standing guard over the achievements of socialism, who are defending peace on earth, are worthy of a high evaluation. [narrator's quotation continues]

The Warsaw meeting of the top party and state leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries was a noteworthy landmark on the path of further consolidation of the unity and cohesion of the socialist countries. It was a major contribution to strengthening the security of the allied states, to preserving and strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world. The delegations signed a protocol extending the treaty for 20 years, with the option of prolonging it for a further 10 years. Firm conviction was voiced at this meeting. War can be prevented. This is the preoccupation of the Communist and workers parties of the socialist countries. This objective has now been served for 30 years by the defensive alliance of the socialist states, which is helping to increase socialism's role in international affairs and which threatens nobody.

The years pass, Socialism will develop and grow stronger, providing man with broad opportunities for personal development and winning more and more support from progressive mankind. But so long as there exists a real threat to the peaceful labor of the citizens of socialist countries, socialism and peace will need protection. The Warsaw Pact will remain their dependable shield."

Video concludes report by showing soldiers running towards at least five AN-12 transport planes. An SA-2 missile on its articulated trailer is viewed. A squad of troops runs into action with a tracked BTR-50P APC visible in the background. A frontal view of a T-54 tank with its two hatches open is followed by a view of rotating twin-barrelled naval gun. An SA-N type twin missile launcher is shown as a Polish MIG-21 takes off. Four MI-24 helicopter gunships in flight fire rockets at targets on the ground. Further view of MIG-21 with its delta-wing configuration clearly visible. BMP-1 tracked reconnaissance vehicles are shown diving at high speed into a river, subsequent views shows a T-54 tank emerging from the river, with snorkel raised. At least nine MI-8 helicopters are seen coming into land by a power station, discharging infantry as they do so. A GDR BMP-1 APC discharges troops. Distant view of a BM-21 multiple rocket launcher firing its rockets. View of a field howitzer, possibly a GDR version of M1938 122-mm weapon, being reloaded. Five T-72 main battle tanks are seen advancing cross-country, with infantry moving up behind them. [A] soldier armed with some kind of bazooka is seen riding in a BTR-60P APC. View of an IL-76 transport plane dropping loads by parachute, with retro-rockets firing just before they hit the ground. Paratroopers land.

CSO: 1801/223

WARSAW PACT

CRITICISM OF MOTORIZED RIFLE TRAINING IN GSF GERMANY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 85 p 1

[Article by Lt Col N. Panyukov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Counting on a Final, All-Out Effort"]

[Text] That day Guards Captain A. Yegizaryan, commander of the motorized rifle company, was to teach his men defensive actions. Judging from the topics listed in the schedule, the class promised to be intense: the fightingmen led by their commanders were to perfect their skills in selecting positions and their engineer preparation, organizing security, observing the "enemy" and laying mixed minefields.

Interest in the class was also evoked by the fact that the regimental staff spoke highly of the battalion of which the company was a part. It was declared best in the unit on the basis of last year's performance. The battalion officers have a reputation of being well prepared methodologically.... I wanted to see for myself how the motorized riflemen are using accumulated experience to perfect their own skills and moving toward the goals set in the socialist commitments.

Here we were at the tactical training area. The personnel were digging trenches unhurriedly and without any special zeal. None of the trainees knew what sort of tactical situation the subunit was operating in. It was also learned that neither the company commander, the section commanders nor those filling in for platoon commanders absent for various reasons had assigned the specific tasks or issued the operational instructions and orders specified for working on the subject. The organization of the platoons' fire system had not been discussed at all. Not one of the sergeants even had the range cards which are mandatory for such a class.

Nor did the company perform any better the next day during a tactical exercise involving field firing. It was obvious that the motorized riflemen were poorly trained in advancing to the line for switching to an attack and did not know how to take advantage of natural features in the process.

During the capture of an "enemy" strongpoint and the repelling of a counterattack, the fightingmen demonstrated an even greater lack of preparedness. When it became necessary to transfer or concentrate fire, the platoon and section commanders were not prepared for this. The percentage of targets destroyed, especially by grenade throwers, was low. They had practically no effect on the counterattacking "enemy" tanks.

Guards Captain Yegizaryan attributed the failure to adverse circumstances. The commander of another company in the battalion, Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Dedyayev, also called it an accident when his men received a poor rating for the firing exercise. How could it be an accident, however, when most of the motorized riflemen were unable to destroy moving targets, and all of the company's sharpshooters received unsatisfactory ratings for the exercise...?

Guards Lieutenant Colonel S. Paksin, battalion commander, also reacted in a peculiar way to omissions in the training of the motorized riflemen. "Some benefit was still gained from the classes..." he said in summary.

It would be difficult to say specifically what he had in mind. It was apparent that both the battalion commander and some of his subordinates had reconciled themselves to deficiencies in the training process. Personnel in the subunit saw nothing alarming in the fact that classes were being postponed, displaced and disrupted. The logic behind the planning of the combat training was not being maintained. For example, it would have been more useful to conduct battle drills prior to the company tactical exercises (which is exactly what the guiding documents require). They were not even planned.

Nor is the mobilizing role of competition put into use in the subunit. One did not feel a spirit of rivalry in the field exercises. The individual commitments of the personnel are still not being posted in the battalion's Lenin rooms.

The more thoroughly one studies the factors giving rise to this attitude toward the work, the more one is convinced that the battalion clearly places too much value on old merits and achievements and counts on putting on a burst during the inspection. Unfortunately, this attitude is being encouraged to a considerable degree by the tolerant position taken by the regimental commander and staff.

11499

CSO: 1801/196

ARMED FORCES

COMMANDER AS KEY TO MODERN COMBAT SUCCESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Col L. Nagornyy, an officer at the Combat Training Directorate for PVO Troops: "The Commander's Decision" under the heading: "Control in Combat"]

[Text] As tension continued to rise in the tactical situation, Lt Col V. Kolesnik, commander of the air defense missile subunit, was distinctly aware that the battle with the powerful and aggressive "enemy" promised to be tough. A wet gray fog hung over the range at that early morning hour, and that seemingly innocent weather feature was also to the advantage of the opposing side.

But, it goes without saying, the chief danger lay with the behavior of the aerial target which had suddenly appeared and which was relentlessly approaching its objective. It was flying at a low altitude and continuously maneuvering. And if you add to this the fact that the small reflecting surface of the target aircraft was barely discernable on the radar scopes, many of the difficulties of the combat operation facing the missile troops at that time will become clear.

Nevertheless, they coped with their mission successfully: the target was destroyed at the far approaches to its objective. One could cite quite a number of factors which determined this success: the excellent quality of the adjustments to the equipment; the excellent training of the crew at the command post; the emotional and volitional stability of the personnel; and so on. However, among the many important conditions for achieving the victory, the professional expertise of Lt Col Kolesnik occupied the position of supremacy.

In the extremely complex situation, it was the commander himself who figured out the "enemy's" intentions, based on intelligence information, and brought the firepower of his subunit to bear. It was the commander himself who calmly and rationally deployed the weapons of his battalion and, at the decisive time, chose just the right moment to launch the missile. One would think that this conclusion is entirely justified in analyzing the role and position of the commander, on whom maximum utilization of the combat capabilities of the surface-to-air missile complex depends.

Modern air defense combat is an extremely complex undertaking. It is fraught with rapid changes and lack of sufficiently complete information about the opposing side. Moreover, at any moment the developing situation may change in terms of the enemy's numerical strength, the direction of his approach to his strike objective, and his flight velocity; target density and echelonment, ECM intensity, etc., may change in a very short time.

It is entirely understandable that the commander's professional expertise and his ability to quickly and correctly react to the constantly-changing situation are especially important in these conditions. Let's return to our example. Lt Col V. Kolesnik came out on top of the situation as the organizer of the battle, because he has been thoroughly trained to carry out the most complicated missions. Specifically, he made an objective evaluation of the capability of the opposing side, which allowed him to foresee the nature of the development of events, and take this into consideration as he made his decisions. The commander gave just as much thought to organizing interaction with the neighboring subunits, and ensured uninterrupted control over the combat operations of his subordinates, making the necessary corrections in a timely manner.

✓ Yes, the spectrum of the commander's responsibilities in organizing a missile battle and controlling it is extremely broad. But the key to success is obvious: he is an officer with a high level of professional training. It is precisely his competence, his boldness in making decisions, his will and firm conviction in combat superiority over the "enemy" that permits him to keep his head in a complex situation. These qualities of the commander also inspire his subordinates to display rational initiative and to achieve maximum output from their acquired expertise. And it is important for the one who fires the missile in single combat with a powerful "enemy" not to underestimate him, or to display the least bit of perplexity or hesitation, since this inevitably has an effect on the main thing--the results of the delivery of fire.

One cannot criticize officer V. Tsibul'skiy for lack of theoretical knowledge. He is well versed in the tactics of modern air defense combat, and you can't trip him up on questions of technical erudition or on his ability to work in harmony with any specialist in the subunit. It would seem that such an officer would feel completely at home with any mission at the range. But you see, it was precisely at combat firing that he failed, and was rated considerably lower than what one expects for an officer. There were several reasons for this.

His problems started with the fact that Tsibul'skiy did not fully evaluate the air situation and became flustered. Several targets were converging on the defended objective from different directions. But Tsibul'skiy did not make use of the information at his disposal on that account. Later, he was slow to carry out the orders of a higher command post, and fired at the wrong target aircraft.

The commander's decision has always been the most important factor in achieving success in battle. The history of military art contains a great multitude of examples in which the best decision of the commander, the military leader, brought about the victory not only when both sides in the battle were of equal ability, but also achieved success for the weaker side. Modern air defense combat has its own specific peculiarities. Chief among these is its rapid fluidity. Whereas during past wars a commander directing the battle could make corrections and amend his decisions in the very process of firing, today's commander does not have this ability. The modern aerial target, capable of supersonic speeds is as a rule within the zone of destruction of the missile complex for only a limited period. Additionally the enemy can, naturally, make all sorts of maneuvers and utilize complex electronic countermeasures... Understandably, the commander's decision today is subject to very severe demands.

The above-described incident with officer Tsibul'sky vividly displays that "book" knowledge and general theoretical training are far from all that is needed for the commander's decision, and for directing a battle. Also needed are systematic and purposeful drills, in order that such knowledge would emerge in a precision launch which hits the target. All commanders of surface-to-air missile subunits and units should always remember this fact well, since it has been proven in practice.

In the current training year, many battalions and regiments are moving from one success to another in socialist competition, in which they have earned excellent marks for missile launches. What is it that draws attention to them? Indisputably, it is the high degree of individual training of the specialists; the cooperation among all the teams; and the solid psychological tempering of the personnel and their ability to endure great physical pressure when carrying out their combat training missions at the range; and many other factors. However, there is no arguing the fact that such subunits are led by commanders who consider increasing their professional expertise the paramount task in their day to day work.

Such commanders are constantly seeking opportunities to improve their skills as organizers of battle. At the same time they strive to master a broad tactical outlook and the system of knowledge and skills which determine their ability to make the intelligent decision in implementing uninterrupted, firm and flexible control over their subunit in a complex, dynamic situation.

But what opportunities are there for an officer to constantly reinforce his theoretical and practical resources? They are very important. Primarily, this means studies in the officer training system. And independent self-improvement provides indisputable benefits.

We shall cite as an example one of the subunit commanders, officer S. Nosov. This officer organizes all drills in such a way, that not only are his subordinates exercised, but also he himself. For this purpose broad use is made of simulators. With the aid of simulators, the activity of a modern aerial opponent can be reproduced--who as is well-known, is capable of great inventiveness and outstanding ingenuity in combat. The task consists of not

only flawlessly discerning his capabilities, but also perceiving his weaknesses, his most vulnerable points; then finding the most reliable means to combat them, taking advantage of the most minute miscalculations in the tactics of the opposing side.

An officer's tactical erudition also presupposes his ability to make maximum effective use of the combat capabilities of the surface-to-air missile complexes. Even if the commander is, as the saying goes, wise as Solomon, he will not be able to put his decisions into effect with maximum effectiveness if his direct subordinates who carry out his orders have some kind of flaw in their training. In this connection I am reminded of a commander of one of the surface-to-air missile battalions, who had earned a good reputation for his mastery of missile launching. He used to say, "Whenever making a decision in combat, I always weigh not only the enemy's forces, and my own capabilities, but also the current state of training of my subordinates".

In a tense, rapidly-changing combat situation, it is extremely important that the crews be trained for action according to several variations. The launch control officer can then select the most appropriate from his "reserve" when he needs it, and thus make an intelligent decision in any critical situation. And that is how they do things in our best subunits, whose personnel are distinguished by their high degree of special and technical training. The arsenal of such training methods includes: the tactical methods of the "enemy"; simulating the latest means of aerial attacks; unexpected use of ECM; having certain elements of equipment go "out of order" in the course of the scenario; and so on. In this manner, those supervising the drills perfect their own professional expertise and many skills as well.

Such drills are concluded with objective critiques. Proceeding from an objective analysis of the actions of their subordinates, the officers at the same time analyze their own combat performance as well. They place special emphasis on how important it is to make original decisions every time, making use of new elements, since this develops creative thinking and helps to achieve the best results in field training missions.

Unfortunately, we must note that such painstaking and persistent efforts are not yet being made everywhere, to graft onto commanders of surface-to-air missile units these solid skills for battle management. The most significant shortcoming here is--oversimplification, adherence to past procedure, and an aversion to innovations in organizing training and drills. Range firing, incidentally, proves that those who are inclined to train others and to train themselves by the old methods do not achieve high results. These shortcomings must be decisively eradicated in order to permit increasing the professional expertise of the missile officers and the coordination of the missile crews--and increasing their combat readiness as a whole.

9006
CSO: 1801/187

ARMED FORCES

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REQUIRES COMMANDERS' COMPUTER LITERACY

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Pozdnyakov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Information Science: What Problems it Poses and Solves in Troop Practice"]

[Text] An "ocean of information" is not an image but an actual reflection of what occurs in the era of scientific-technical progress. Today an enormous multitude of books, journals, pamphlets and accounts is published in the world... Suffice it to say that each year the shelves of the largest depository--the USSR State Library imeni V. I. Lenin--are lengthened 15 km. The volume of just management and organizational information which originates in only one year exceeds 600 billion pages.

The following words were heard back in 1613: "One of the illnesses of our century is the large number of books; they have so filled the world that there is no opportunity to digest this." That was said by philosopher B. (Rich). Time aggravated the problem. Two centuries later another scientist, H. Lichtenberg, felt the information flow in his own way: "After finding truth in nature, people toss it into a book where it is even more difficult to find."

Today the amount of information circulating in society and reflecting the development of science, technology, production and military affairs is proportionate to the square of the gross national product. And even the specialists will not always answer unequivocally as to just what information science is--a field of knowledge or an industry.

The paper methods (we will call them that) for fixing, storing, transmitting and using information are no longer effective and even retard scientific-technical progress. The following is proof of this: the planet's scientists spend some third of their work time seeking necessary information and approximately a fifth of appropriations for science is expended on searching for what is already known. The majority of applications for inventions is rejected because there is nothing novel in them. In designing, let's say, 80 percent of the work sometimes goes for compiling, checking and duplicating technical documentation.

According to UN forecasts, by the year 1990 information science will become one of the basic sectors in a majority of the industrially developed countries. Even now, however, its development level largely determines the scientific-technical potential of society and the social changes occurring therein.

Thus the information load on the human brain is growing like an avalanche. Its annual growth rate is 10 percent. Meanwhile, each of us is capable of taking in only a certain volume of information--approximately one billion bits (a bit is a unit quantity of information). The very process of "inputting" information into our memory and, most important, its selection also has its limitations. The EVM [electronic computer] can solve this problem. Electronic computers expand information access many times. Without them the search for necessary data would become a search for a needle in a haystack.

This too has its curious figures. The cost of memory, one of the most important elements in data processing and storage technology, is dropping 40 percent a year while the overall memory capacity of all classes of computers in the world is doubling in a half-year.

The role of computerization in improving management of the national economy is apparent just from the fact that the ASU [automated control system] increases an enterprise's work efficiency by 10-15 percent, that of a sector by 50-60 percent, and that of a national economic complex by 100 percent. The level of planning, quality of management, and degree of efficiency and coordination of the work of all components (and these are essential factors of efficiency) depend on the information infrastructure, production's nervous system.

And now about why the officer needs the computer. The answers to this question can vary widely but if an attempt were made to sum them up, two opposite viewpoints probably would predominate.

Some perhaps would refer to the fact that we have more than enough other problems. Exercises, marches, firings, periodic technical servicings, repairs and various kinds of reporting. Others, on the other hand, would declare that a small computer helps them accomplish many tasks facing them quickly and reliably: saving fuel and engine time, making more effective use of equipment, teaching personnel, constructing a combat model...

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin has words full of deep meaning: "We either have to master higher technology or be crushed." Modern combat is becoming not only opposition of fire, but of information as well. It can be said conclusively that automated systems for weapon and troop control, signal equipment, electronic warfare and reconnaissance affect the course and outcome of combat enormously more than before.

The volume of information which the commander must consider and process for decisionmaking also has grown many times. This has been caused by the expansion in interworking of troops, by the growing complexity of combat equipment, and by the significant increase in the dynamism and scope of combat actions. Today it is impossible to accomplish all these tasks without the computer.

But it is also apropos to quote the following statement, which has become an aphorism: the computer is valuable to that extent to which the person using it is valuable. The level of planning of combat actions, validity of forecasting their course and outcome, and efficiency of control using the computer do not preclude imagination at all. We are talking about man-machine systems in which man interfaces with the machine, programs its actions and takes advantage of its broad opportunities.

The deeper and fuller the understanding of the very problem being solved, the more effective this interface is. With machine methods of data storage and processing the search for necessary information takes minutes while the size of the devices storing the data can in no way be compared with the references, books, and so on. The person who has not learned to use a computer is like a person who is unable to read and write. That is the criterion of the times.

Computer literacy acquires special importance when we are speaking of military engineering and command cadres. The struggle for so-called information characteristics--accuracy, controllability, protection from jamming--comes to the foreground in the development of weapons and combat equipment. In fact, with an increase in weapon accuracy the necessary result is achieved with lesser firepower. Information technology seemingly focuses energy in space and time, and this is equivalent to an increase in power.

Information science substantially broadened opportunities for integration of military equipment, and this is the path toward improving its combat efficiency. The latter now is provided not only by the attendant personnel, whose capabilities are limited in the speed and volume of processing information, but also by the computer, which everyone must have the ability to handle.

Significant changes also are occurring in the organization of military equipment operation. Microelectronic objective monitoring and troubleshooting systems allow shifting from planned preventive, prophylactic organization of work to operation based on objective condition of the equipment. This saves personnel and assets and accelerates the maintenance process, which means it increases combat readiness.

Information science plays a great role in improving soldiers' combat proficiency. Simulators have been made on the basis of computers which permit the crews of tanks, ships, aircraft and various combat vehicles and systems to be trained more effectively and with lesser overall expenditures. The simulators also permit modeling those combat situations which are not always reproducible even in exercises. Command and staff exercises and games conducted not only on maps but also with the use of electronic situation models approximate reality enormously more.

The troops are being saturated more and more with effective means for automating control and with microelectronic and computer technology. This is a natural process. The means and methods of information science radically increase the productivity of mental labor, significantly expand people's intellectual and creative capabilities, and permit solving problems of which the "naked" brain was incapable. All this requires a knowledge of information science and its methods, and the ability to make full use of computer technology.

6904

CSO: 1801/192

ARMED FORCES

WRITER PONDERES LESSONS OF WW II

PM121818 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 May 85 p 15

[Article by Robert Rozhdestvenskiy from feature entitled "The Spring of Liberation": "Lessons in Remembrance"--capitalized passages within slant-lines printed in boldface]

[Text] Two salutes were fired in Moscow on the evening of 9 May 1945. The first was in honor of the liberation of Prague, the second--and the most long-awaited--in honor of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. A proud and unconditional victory.

It is 40 years since that evening, 40 years.

But I still keep seeing in my mind's eyes, through a mist of tears, the flashes of festive fireworks and the long fingers of the searchlights solemnly crossing in the sky above Moscow. Next to me, and all around me, the incredible crush in Red Square, with everyone looking up at the sky and everyone shouting something, shouting incessantly, shouting and crying and laughing. The war is over, it's over!....

In the West, during press conferences and appearances, Soviet writers are often asked one and the same question: "Tell us, why do you still keep on writing about the war? Why do you keep its memory alive? After all, you yourselves are the ones who say that war is something evil, something terrible. Normal human memory must not retain anything evil or terrible.... Can't you understand: man can live more easily if he remembers only the good things, the bright things!.... But you--war and nothing but war!.... Does your memory function differently...?"

No, our memory functions in the very same way as in all normal people. But the anguish which befell us in '41, the anguish which tore our hearts apart for 4 long years, the anguish which at that time was part of our days and nights, of our workdays and holidays, of our hopes and dreams--this anguish is implanted in our genes and now it is impossible to forget it. Nor do we want to forget it.

We know what real war is /We know./ and our knowledge is interwoven with our own blood, our own weariness, our own grief. Therefore, we remember the war and we write about it not at all because we enjoy such memories, but because we do not want a repetition. If people forget the last war, a new war will inevitably knock on their door.

It is, after all, no accident that some Western historians and politicians, deliverating on World War II, speak about it in such elegiac tones and try "not to go into" its details--for example, they "do not recall" our sacrifices and efforts and "forget" the Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the victory over fascism.

They try--unsuccessfully and inconsolably--to explain the collapse of Hitler's plans in terms of "an adverse coincidence of circumstances," "complex weather conditions" (be it frost, slush, or heat), and "tragic mistakes by the fascist generals. In actual fact, for some reason they are now altogether unwilling to remember fascism itself.

But then, at the same time, the simple idea that "for mankind, war is something ordinary, something completely normal, and that, if the issue is approached without prejudice, a small limited war is, to some extent, even very useful..." is being implanted more and more frequently and persistently in the minds of people living in the West from newspaper and magazine pages, from television screens, and from high government rostrums.

(Here is a linguistic paradox: hot heads are appreciated more than ever in times of "cold war," while an arms freeze occurs only when there is no "cold war.")

The most unpretentious, but pretty widespread, definition of happiness claims: "Happiness is when things are going well for me...."

There is, however, a certain category of people who, while agreeing in principle with the above-mentioned formula, still consider it incomplete and unbalanced and accept it subject to a mandatory addition: "Happiness is when things are going well for me and badly for the other guy....!"

The U.S. administration has proclaimed that henceforth America's happiness lies in the strength of its weapons. They are proud of this strength, they boast of it and threaten with it without restraint, they are constantly augmenting it and displaying it on every suitable and unsuitable occasion. Furthermore, they make no secret at all of the fact that this entire strength is aimed against our country, against our allies, and against those developing countries which are unwilling to submit to American diktat.

The transatlantic hawks, proceeding from their own understanding of happiness, would like to live in a world where they alone would be strong and all others weak. But such a world does not exist.

What does exist on earth is a force which really counters the United States' imperial ambitions. We, the Soviet Union, are this force. We will not strive to be the strongest in the world. /But we have been, are, and will be strong enough. This is the lesson we learned in the last war./

The past is instructive. Or, at least, it ought to be instructive. Whoever is unwilling to learn from the past is doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. He can even make a mistake on the most important point.

For example, when they unleashed the arms race, the Western strategists and practitioners proclaimed their "collateral" intention: To undermine the Soviet state's economy. Our foes are hoping that we will not keep up and ultimately we will find ourselves short on both forces and funds.

But they are forgetting again one of the lessons of the Great Patriotic War. They are forgetting the fact that our industry, evacuated to the East, built up literally within months a furious and unprecedented might before which the highly organized war machine of Hitlerite German collapsed...! They may say: "All this did happen, but times have changed and the technology is not the same...." I agree. Times really have changed and the technology is far from being the same.

But Soviet people's spiritual strength and nature have remained the same! And it is beyond the capacity of any computer to calculate the potential capacity of this nature and of this strength....

I was told by a Western journalist I know at a writers' conference: "Listen, what would it cost you to set an example and stop....? Let the Americans waste money on their weapons, let them go mad. And you can stop at what already exists, get out of this absurd and pointless race. On your own. On your own initiative...."

All right, suppose we accept this proposal. Suppose that the United States and the NATO countries arm themselves, deploy their latest missile, anti-missile, laser, and other systems, build strategic strike bombers, produce ultramodern nuclear submarines, and modernize their armor, tank, artillery, paratroop, and other forces. Also suppose that we do nothing of the sort. We will say: Enough! We will close our eyes and start living, paying no attention to any threats or actions. Maybe it will work out....

And what do you think will happen then?

This is what will happen: as soon as the American military strategists sense that we really are weaker than them and--the main point--that we cannot respond convincingly and quickly to their attack, they will strike! They will definitely strike. Absolutely, without any doubt.

You see, they have no pity for the weak. They acknowledge no mercy for those who cannot defend themselves. Remember Lebanon. Remember Grenada. Look how the Americans are behaving along Nicaragua's borders....

The following professional expressions is current: "Theater of Military Operations" (TMO for short).

I am convinced that the person who invented this expression was obviously a high-ranking officer and was most directly connected with some country's general staff. Because only from that vantage point can war be seen as such a majestic spectacle which, like in classical tragedy, has the three famous unities (the unities of time, place, and action), its own producers, lead actors, extras, prompters, set decorators, and stage hands.

This "theater" also has its audience (at least, there have been audiences in all previous wars). We may classify as the audience the curious or even indifferent residents of other countries, those totally unaffected by the war due to the geographical distance separating them from the location of the conflict.

And so, Theater of Military Operations. TMO.

This typical collocation is appearing to increase frequently in today's newspapers and magazines. American ones in particular. U.S. military specialists eagerly and freely deliberate on the European TMO, the Near East TMO, the Pacific TMO....

I have even read an article which spoke about the training of special troops for operations in the Siberian TMO! This is how far the American "playwrights" and "producers" have gone. What is interesting is that for some reason they say nothing about a North American TMO. They probably think that it won't come to that....

But it will come to that. The "limited nuclear war", which they are so diligently advertising and preparing, can rightly be described as limited since it will be limited to the extent of the earth's globe.

Mankind understands that today we are already talking about the life and death of world civilization. Mankind is struggling for peace. People representing the most diverse nationalities, age groups, beliefs, and professions are taking part in this struggle.

An international organization, the "league of concerned scientists," was established recently. The outstanding scientists of the world who belong to the league are unanimously saying, with vast knowledge of the subject and with confirmed facts and figures to hand, that a future atomic war will not only have no victors, but it will not have any of the traditional neutral countries, "observers from the side lines," the very "audiences" which have always existed in previous wars. Such is the harsh reality of our earthly age.

We must defend the peace which was fought for 40 years ago! We must defend it for the sake of our memory, for the sake of our planet's future generations. And we will definitely do this, because mankind today comprises a league of concerned people.

ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Officer Seeks Regular Assignment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 85 p 2

[Letter to the editor by Sr Lt V. Sorokin: "It Reduces Responsibility"]

[Text] Dear Editors! According to my post I am a technician for a prescribed maintenance group in the technical maintenance unit of an air regiment. But for several years already I have been performing the duties of senior technician in the squadron. I seem to cope with the work successfully. But I was not assigned to this post by an order. It turns out that in this situation I, as an "outsider," cannot bear legal responsibility in full measure for the quality of the equipment being serviced in this situation, either.

I turned to the deputy squadron commander for the Air Force Engineer Service of the squadron, Major Buykovskiy, as regards this. But I received an unexpected answer: there are no free posts in the subunit. Then I turned to the squadron commander and once again--no result. But as there are no vacant posts in the subunit, it means that someone is occupying them. It turns out that the one who I am unofficially replacing is substituting for some other specialist just as unofficially. Doesn't such a "chain" lead away from responsibility and from the struggle for flight safety? And although I place my signature in the service log for the preparation of the combat aircraft for takeoff with all responsibility, I think that this is not a formal matter.

Lack of Initiative Attacked

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 85 p 2

[Letter to editor by Capt 3d Rank O. Zhamangarinov: "There Should Have Been Striving"]

[Text] Officers V. Makarov and V. Grinyayev are serving on our ship. Both are subunit commanders and both have occupied their posts for several years. And both are first-class specialists. But then, the officers are not striving to grow further and become masters. And what excuses you hear from them when the conversation turns to this. And their main tune; not everyone is equal to the title of master, they say.

But I am convinced: it is not a shortage of abilities which became the brake on their growth, but first of all a lack of commander's responsibility and a failure to understand that constant improvement in the level of one's special training is not a happy desire for an officer but his service duty and the most important component of his authority.

Responses to Letter on Rudeness

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 85 p 2

[Article by Capt M. Ionov, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Siberian Military District: "Who Else if not Us?"]

[Text] On 13 February of this year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a letter from Guards Junior Sergeant A. Shchetinin, "They Do Not Like Their Kind in the Battery." It discussed the moral situation in the subunit and the role of the Komsomol organization in the rallying of the collective. As the mail shows, the letter found a warm response among our readers. They are all unanimous in the opinion that a strong Komsomol barrier should be placed against instances of rudeness and so-called unauthorized mutual relations.

Today we tell about the discussion of Guards Junior Sergeant Shchetinin's letter in one of the troop collectives.

This motorized rifle company is considered satisfactory in our regiment as regards the state of military discipline. There are no coarse violations of prescribed military order here and, on the whole, the assigned missions are accomplished successfully. Many young servicemen are serving in the subunit, but thanks to the assistance and support of their more experienced comrades their development is proceeding successfully.

It would appear that all is well in the collective and that there is nothing to worry about. However, Guards Junior Sergeant Shchetinin's letter forced the men to ponder their attitude toward service and toward their comrades, to look at behavior critically, and evaluate the state of affairs more strictly.

I had the occasion to attend a discussion of the letter in which the company commander, Captain G. Bruy, and the political officer, Lieutenant V. Dal'chanin, took part. No, this was not a Komsomol meeting and not any planned measure with a rigid time limit. In my opinion a frank collective conversation took place concerning what disturbs the people.

It began with a question by one of the men: "Are there people in our company like Cheshuin and Snadin about whom the letter's author writes?" I leaf through my notebook and it is as if I again hear the young, not indifferent voices....

Junior Sergeant V. Tashbulatov, member of the company Komsomol buro: For the present we do not have any people like this. Why do I say for the present?

Because everything will depend on how we, the Komsomols, will begin to relate to one another. If someone offends or insults a comrade or, as they say, shifts part of his burden to the shoulders of others and we make it seem that we did not notice this and considered it to be a petty detail, then a moral crack will appear in the collective.

Private First Class S. Skorik, Komsomol group organizer of a platoon: Correct, but why should we wait for something? Of course, we all recall the recent incident involving Private M. Simonyan, when he tried to avoid work in the field. And why didn't those of us who were next to him hold him responsible?

Junior Sergeant Ye. Gavryushov, squad leader: If we speak frankly, then he is not the only such one in the company. I don't want to offend Private First Class S. Yuldashev, but quite frequently he tries to be where it is a little easier. The collective is correct to make claims against Private First Class O. Trifonov, too. And let us see what the Komsomol organization of the company did to call such as these to order.

Sergeant Ye. Sidorov, secretary of the company Komsomol buro: I accept the criticism. At times we are distracted by speechifying and we hurry to "close the file." We discussed and announced punishment.... And they, as formerly, remain aloof and shut themselves up in a circle of their narrow interests. But you see, you don't win over those who like a peaceful life by this. Daily work is needed, with an accurate sight, as they say.

And how do our Komsomol meetings proceed? Do they always cut to the quick? Let us take something more recent from the agenda, "The company--your combat family." The question, as they say, concerns the news of the day. And the report which the secretary of the regimental party committee gave was interesting. And what did we do ourselves? We organized a unique roll call of those who are not sparing in assistance and on whom we can count in any situation. But not a word was heard about what disturbs us and where we still have a shortfall. Some were afraid to spoil relations with someone, others displayed indifference, and still others simply believe that everything is really well with us, everything is smooth, and there are no problems. Is this really a Komsomol approach to a matter...?

Junior Sergeant Ye. Gavryushov: I agree with the secretary. Here I note some dissociation into individual groups in the company: some--were called up on the same day, others proved to be fellow-villagers. We do not have enough common cohesion.

Lieutenant V. Dal'chanin: There is nothing blameworthy in the fact that, let us say, men from the same training subunit or fellow-villages are friends. It is bad when they begin to remain aloof, and the more so--to set themselves off against the collective. And you see, we are one combat family. And here they are united not only by the same uniform, common roof overhead, and food from a common pot. Here the main thing uniting them is service to the motherland. Whatever the reliable weapon which your hands squeeze, you should always have confidence in your comrade who rises up next to you in the attack.

Junior Sergeant V. Tashbulatov: I am confident that the one who does not treasure army friendship is unreliable in battle. For example, how can I count on the assistance of Private E. Ganbarov at a difficult moment? One day, he tried to force another soldier to police up the premises in his place. And take Private S. Atashev. He can answer rudely and make fun of people.

Senior Sergeant S. Mezentsev, deputy platoon leader: Here much depends on us, the sergeants. On our demandingness, devotion to principle, on our mutual relations with our fellow-servicemen....

Captain G. Bruy: Of course, the mutual relations of the sergeant with his subordinates should only be as prescribed by the regulations. Take Sergeant O. Korotayev. He is always calm and self-possessed. He does not deviate a step from the requirements of the regulations and does not permit his subordinates to do so. And the soldiers dote on him. Because he shares both their difficulties and their joys. This is who should be taken as an example in doing everything so that the mutual relations of the people in the collective are structured exclusively on a prescribed basis and so that friendship is strengthened the equal of that of the front.

This exacting conversation continued for a long time. Each one was anxious about his own subunit and each one wanted, figuratively speaking, those specks of rust which, if timely measures are not adopted, can inflict harm on a harmonious and unified collective and do not permit marching farther in combat improvement to disappear. The combat solidarity and firm friendship of the multinational collective will help in the successful accomplishment of obligations in the competition under the slogan, "Our selfless soldierly labor for the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress!"

Reserve Officers Neglected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank S. Ishchenko: "Then What Does He Want?"]

[Text] "Do you know on whom I can always count?"

The deputy commander of the military construction detachment for political affairs, Major N. Chirov, fell silent for an instant as if trying to recall the needed name.

"On Lieutenant Kozlov," he said after a short pause. "Young, energetic! Whatever he undertakes turns out well."

I had already heard good comments about the deputy company commander for political affairs, Lieutenant V. Kozlov. And from the unit commander, Lieutenant Colonel V. Belousov, and other officers and warrant officers [praporshchik]. A recent graduate of the higher military-political school, from his first days of service Lieutenant Kozlov was able to show his best features.

But I was more interested in another young officer who, just as Lieutenant Kozlov, had just become firmly established in the post of deputy company commander for political affairs--Senior Lieutenant V. Matorin.

"This Matorin greatly interested you," Chirov shrugged his shoulders. "You see, I have already said that he is in the wrong place, is far from party political work, does not know its principles and rudiments.... Then what does he want?"

Let me say directly, the account of Major Chirov placed the political deputy of the 3d Company, Senior Lieutenant Matorin, in a miserable light. Unconscientious, sluggish, he does not make a show of his knowledge. He should work on himself painstakingly and persistently, but this painstaking nature is not evident, the young officer's striving to improve himself professionally is not evident. And how can a political officer get along without this, especially he, Matorin, who completed the Food Industry Institute and was called up into the army from the reserve.

"In return, he likes to preach and criticize," Major Chirov noted disapprovingly.

The deputy detachment commander for political affairs showed with his entire appearance that he was already pretty much worn out with such a subordinate, had studied him thoroughly, and did not intend to change his opinion. By the way, for the present I did not even insist on an opinion. I only attempted to learn how deeply the political officer knows the young officer's strong and weak aspects and whether the latter is really in the wrong place. And here is a detail which put me on my guard. I asked him to specify Matorin's first name and patronymic. But Major Chirov suddenly retired to the background and could not recall the name of a person with whom he has already been serving for half a year.

At first glance, it would appear, an annoying misunderstanding. But only at first glance.

A letter from Senior Lieutenant Matorin brought me to this unit. In turning to the editors, the young officer did not conceal that service is not easy for him. And not only because he was called up from the reserve and, this means that he does not have sufficient training, the necessary knowledge, and certain skills. All this, as they say, will come with time. There should be the desire to serve. And he, stressed the author, has it. The main difficulty is that they are indifferent toward him in the collective and, really, toward the other young officers called up from the reserve. Beginner specialists are virtually left to their own devices. No one really works with them and systematically teaches them anything. And as a result of such an attitude--mistakes and miscalculations in service for which they must listen to endless reproaches and dressing downs.

"Oh that's how it is," Major Chirov uttered in anger. "We don't teach.... We are not interested.... Well, you look here...."

A training plan for company political officers lay on a table.

The plan appeared to be rather impressive. A decisive "accomp." opposite all points without exception evidently was to convince someone that here this document is followed undeviatingly. But with its more detailed study and after talks with the company commanders and their political deputies it was learned

that everything in it is sheer eyewash. During the last half-year something like a lesson was conducted only once. Then the officers were made acquainted with some of the guidance documents (in accordance with which, by the way, the Armed Forces had lived for a long time). This occurred last November after Senior Lieutenant Matorin, speaking at a party meeting, once touched on the question of the attitude toward young officers.

Later our talk continued in Matorin's presence.

"Do I really close the door in your face?" Major Chirov, glancing at him, reproachfully shook his head. "Come, ask, I will not refuse you help, you know. But you don't come.... You must conduct training." Now the political officer already cast a glance in my direction: You see, he said, what kind of person this Matorin is.

But how can one go for advice and assistance to a person who is not distinguished by a sense of tact--one encounters reproach and rudeness. By the way, there already was a letter about this from the unit to higher headquarters. A commission from the political directorate of the Northern Fleet was occupied with the complaint. It established that the complaint was substantiated. So there is hardly any sense in accusing Matorin of a lack of initiative. He simply guessed how Major Chirov would greet him.

But you see, the political officer himself was required to display concern for the young officer. And first of all, in the plane of his professional growth and the strengthening of the person in a matter which was new, serious, and important for him. But there was no attention nor that tactfulness or kindness which instill in a person confidence in his own strength and help him to rise slightly above difficulties on Chirov's part. The stereotype of Major Chirov's lessons was reduced to one thing--get everything yourself. Take at least the following fact. Matorin was assigned the task to reequip the Lenin Room. He turned for advice to the deputy detachment commander for political affairs: he said, where can paints and other materials be obtained? The answer was a laconic:

"Get them wherever you want!"

Other examples also tell about indifference. Having served for several months, Matorin never received an overcoat. He wore a padded jacket. The same thing also occurred with Senior Lieutenant S. Yakubin--also a political officer and also called up from the reserve. Neither Major N. Chirov nor other officials of the unit displayed elementary human interest here. Nor was it displayed by the secretary of the party organization, Major A. Katko. The party organization was not very concerned about specific assistance for the young officers in their development. And there was not even talk about distinguishing in this work such a category as officers called up from the reserve.

But where did such an attitude toward them come from in the unit all the same? It is not necessary to rack one's brains for long over an answer. One can say, it lies on the surface and sounded unambiguously in the words of the very same Major Chirov. And it is reduced to the fact that here their attitude toward Senior Lieutenant Matorin and those like him is as toward "temporaries." Well,

they called them up to the army, they served their time, and they'll return home again. What is the point in expending time, nerves, and energy on them? But you see, the people have been entrusted with an important and serious matter and one should relate to them so seriously, so responsibly, and in the party and state manner. They should feel concern and receive assistance. And this is what the young officer wants. And there is an innumerable large number of facts where with just such an attitude people quickly felt at ease in a new matter and accomplished their soldierly duty in a worthy manner. And later many tied their fate with the army for all their lives.

Before departing, I met with the company commander, Senior Lieutenant O. Pozdnyakov. He is an experienced officer. Pozdnyakov answered briefly about his political deputy:

"Matorin is a principled person and a worker. Of course, it is a little difficult for him; he does not have sufficient professional skills. But if you prompt and teach him, he will become a good political officer."

When I left the garrison, I already knew that one officer was to be transferred to another unit. And, of course, they decided to "transfer" Senior Lieutenant Matorin. I immediately recalled the words which the young officer uttered on bidding me farewell:

"It shouldn't turn out that my forced departure from the company would be presented by someone as a graphic lesson for others. Here, they would say, is this Matorin; he caused inconvenience, required attention, and where is he now?... Would it be fair?"

As we see, this story has not yet ended. But it is believed that it should only end fairly and in no other way.

Editor's Mail Surveyed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 85 p 2

[Article: "'KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's' Mail"]

[Text] The editors received 30,799 letters in February. Of them 480 were published. One thousand four hundred and thirty-nine responses to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's articles were received.

The range of questions and subjects touched upon by the readers in the letters addressed to the editors was broad and varied. Predominant in the February mail of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was the subject of the unity of the party and the people which was demonstrated with great force in the course of preparations for and the conduct of elections to the Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics and local Soviets of People's Deputies and the soldierly and labor exploit of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War.

The memory of the war and the heroism of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear is imperishable. Our reader with 30 years of service, A. Ponomarenko of Ul'yanovsk, requests that we publish under the heading "Answer, Friends of the Front!" an announcement concerning a search for crew members of his T-34:

G. Troyeglazov, A. Vlasov, and A. Golovushkin. It was they who, in 1944 at the Ukrainian village of Ocheretnya, disdaining death rushed to help a red-star Il-2 which had made a forced landing in enemy territory. Firing on a fascist armored personnel carrier, the valiant tankmen fastened a cable to the landing gear of the airplane and towed it over to their side. Many other letters on a heroic subject were devoted to the mutual assistance of the various Armed Services and combat arms.

Fewer and fewer veterans of the war are remaining among us. But those who are alive are in formation as formerly. They are working in the national economy as far as possible, are engaged in important military-patriotic work and, as evidenced by letters, took part in ceremonies devoted to the 67th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces and, in particular, in the All-Union Month of Mass-Defense Work. Their enthusiasm and readiness to work tirelessly cause deep respect. "Ten years ago," writes frontline veteran A. Zlyvko from Chernigov Oblast, "I worked for 10 days without compensation for those who did not return from the war. And now, on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Victory, I pledge to work just as much time in a sovkhos-technicum and to turn over the money for my labor to the Peace Fund."

The price of victory is well known in our country. It is difficult to find a family which was not touched by the war. "Four sons of a peasant of the Ukrainian village of Zhornishche, Nikofo Antonovich Boyko--Vasiliy, Gerasim, Ivan, and Roman--fought courageously on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War," writes Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) I. Babin from Vinnitsa. "Their soldierly exploits are shown by the exhibit of the museum-room which was opened recently on the initiative of a teacher of a local school, G. Burmistrenko. Very many exhibits are devoted to the middle brother--Ivan Nikofoorovich Boyko. He was awarded the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union twice."

The letter of Captain A. Kozilo from the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev is about brothers, but of those who are serving now. "Cadet Nikolay Strel'nikov," it says in the letter, "is an expert in training and a Lenin grant-aided student. And his older brothers, officers Sergey and Igor' Strel'nikov, who completed our school earlier are serving with the troops successfully. Senior Lieutenant A. Kubatko commands our leading cadet platoon. Yuriy and Vladimir Kubatko, older brothers and officers, recently wrote him about high results in combat and political training. The brothers are preparing to greet the 40th anniversary of the Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy manner."

Many of our readers report on the course of socialist competition dedicated to the most important events in the country's life. Guards Major A. Chupin of the Turkestan Military District, for example, writes that on recent exercises the missilemen of the battery on whose rosters Hero of the Soviet Union Junior Lieutenant V. Tikhonov is enrolled forever were commended by the command. As reported to the editors by Senior Lieutenant Yu. Kondrat'yev, among the ships serving in the Mediterranean Sea the escort ships "Pylkiy" and "Bezzavetnyy" are the leaders in the competition.

Evidence of the indestructible solidarity of the Soviet people around the Communist Party was the election to the Supreme Soviets of the union and autonomous republics and local Soviets of People's Deputies which took place. Lieutenant Colonel S. Shvytkin of the Moscow Air Defense District, Major N. Ivanov of the Far East Military District, and Private A. Kozlovich of the Central Asian Military District wrote the editors about this. The high level of activity and patriotic enthusiasm of the men with whom they came to the ballot boxes is noted in the letters.

Negligent Attitude Brings Punishment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 85 p 2

[Article: "Good Uncles from Khashuri"]

[Text] A report by Lieutenant Colonel A. Yurkin was published under this heading last 21 December. It discussed the negligence of a number of officials, as a result of which the leave for family circumstances which had been granted to Private G. Nozadze had been excessively delayed.

As reported to the editors by the first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Transcaucasus Military District, Major General N. Merkushev, the newspaper article was discussed at a conference of generals and officers of the political directorate and staff of the district, in the political departments of the district's rear services and special units of the Tbilisi garrison, military commissariats, and military hospitals and was also studied by commanders, political officers, and medical personnel of troop units and large units. The criticism was acknowledged to be correct. The chief of the political department of the Georgian SSR military commissariat, Colonel R. Nioradze, the chief of the district's rear services political department, Colonel A. Polyakov, and the deputy chief of the district military hospital for political affairs, Colonel Yu. Troshin, were heard in the political directorate. The serious omissions in indoctrinational work with leader personnel and other officers and the low effectiveness of the struggle against violations of legality were pointed out to them strictly. Heard in the political department of the special units of the Tbilissi garrison were the military commandant of the garrison, Lieutenant Colonel A. Chutlashvili, and an officer of the commandant's office, Captain P. Dan'shin, to whom the necessity for a more thorough check of complaints and a principled reaction to them was pointed out. Other measures were also adopted to improve administrative and management activity and increase the responsibility of officials. It is planned to examine the status of and measures for improving the activity of the military commissariats at a session of the district's military council.

For coarse violation of legality and abuse of his service status, the military commissar of Khashurskiy rayon, Lieutenant Colonel N. Kandinashviliy, was recommended for release to the reserve. Disciplinary punishment was awarded to the section chief of the military commissariat, Major T. Gordadze, the deputy chief of the district hospital, Colonel of Medical Service Ye. Zayev, and Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service O. Sidor. They were all made answerable to the party.

The chiefs of the political departments of the Transcaucasus Military District's rear services and the military commissariat of the Georgian SSR also informed the editors concerning measures which have been adopted in connection with the newspaper article.

Vehicle Inspection Service Criticized

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Mozgovoy, Transbaykal Military District: "The Responsibility Is Mutual"]

[Text] It was with interest that I read in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA articles devoted to the Military Automotive Inspection Service [VAI]. I share completely the opinion of the authors that commanders, political officers, and vehicle commanders should regard the valid remarks of the VAI duty inspectors keenly and with responsibility and eliminate shortcomings rapidly.

However, the officials who are performing the duties of military motor vehicle inspectors should be examples of self-control and responsibility. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of our garrison's VAI. No so long ago, a UAZ-469 vehicle belonging to our unit was stopped and sent to the detained vehicle collection point. In this case, I consider the actions of the VAI to be correct. But here I turned to the garrison commandant with the request for organizing the proper protection of the vehicle. For it says in the guidance documents: "At the detained vehicle collection point transportation means are protected as established by the garrison commander in accordance with the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces." But the commandant answered that he is not responsible for the completeness and safe keeping of detained vehicles.

As it turned out, a 1984 vehicle had its storage battery and the electric motor of the interior heater removed. During the night, someone replaced the hood with one that was bent. In short, the new vehicle could not return to the unit under its own power.

Somewhat earlier, this same vehicle which was detained by the VAI inspector was not returned to the unit for 15 days. During all this time, on the instructions of the garrison commandant it was operated actively, having put on 1,500 kilometers.

I think that senior commanders have a reason to remind the officials of our garrison that the requirements of the regulations are equally mandatory for those being inspected as well as for the inspectors.

Reservist Misassigned

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 82 p 2

[Letter by Lt A. Shubin: "Not in his Specialty..."]

[Text] Dear Editors! I was recently called up from the reserve by the Voroshilovskiy rayon military commissariat of the city of Moscow and sent to perform two years of officer service in the Air Force of the Volga Military District. That I would perform my honorable duty in aviation pleased me. By specialty I am a computer programmer. True, the military department of the Moscow Economics-Statistics Institute trained us in another specialty, but programming is now urgent in any service and combat arm. I perceived with joy and excitement being sent to the Balashovskoye Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots imeni Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov to the aircraft radar equipment department. I thought: to be engaged in programming to support the flight of aircraft--this is absorbing and interesting.

But alas, my hopes to bring the greatest possible value in service dissipated. There were no posts in my specialty and I was appointed technician of an aviation equipment group in an An-26 squadron. However, I never worked with electrical equipment in my life. Of course, I understand that I must be where they order me. I will master my new specialty. But nevertheless, it is probably expensive for the state to retrain me. In this case is my assignment to a post which is not in my specialty justified?

Responsibilities in Battalion Investigated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col M. Lishniy, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Responsibility...According to Schedule"]

[Text] Dear Editors! For some time an official has been introduced in our battalion who is not called for by the regulations--a so-called battalion responsible officer. He is an officer who is on daily duty in the subunit. Not so long ago, they abandoned the word "responsible." A new term is now used: "battalion duty officer." A long list of duties has been drawn up for this duty officer which includes points prescribed by the regulation for the battalion commander, battery commanders, political officers, regimental duty officer, and battery duty officer. In which regard, for style and content the document imitates the provisions of the regulations. And if one thinks it over, the battalion "responsible officer" or "duty officer" is to be responsible for all aspects of the subunit's life. Then what remains for the regular officials and the personnel of the daily detail called for by the regulations? (From the letter by Guards Senior Lieutenant N. Krylov.)

I arrived in the unit where the letter's author serves late in the evening. Just beyond the traffic regulating post an officer marched toward me and saluted:

"Regimental responsible officer Guards Captain Prilutskiy."

Next to the "responsible officer" was a large group of officers with and without armbands on their sleeves. I read the inscriptions on the armbands and was surprised: what kinds of duty officers and responsible officers weren't there! I could not immediately find the regimental duty officer, the main person of the daily detail in the regiment who is envisioned by the regulations, among them.

"It is a kind of formation of responsible and duty officers prior to the evening check," Guards Captain Prilutskiy explained the situation. "They will now set off for the subunits...."

In the battalion where the platoon leader, Guards Senior Lieutenant N. Krylov, serves I met the "responsible officer" Guards Lieutenant A. Chudinovskiy at that evening hour. And in addition to him, in the subunit were the battalion commander, Guards Major V. Korzo, his political deputy, Guards Captain V. Belous, and battery first sergeants Guards Warrant Officers [praporshchik] A. Vederik and D. Gutov.

Meanwhile, for the soldiers and sergeants recall did not turn out quite as prescribed by the regulation. Prior to going to sleep, some of the soldiers decided to smoke, others--to sew new under-collars, and still others simply walked along the corridors. Guards Major Korzo called the attention of the "responsible officer" to the disorder several times. In turn, Guards Lieutenant Chudinovskiy pointed out the shortcomings to the battery "responsible officers." The first sergeants issued instructions to the squad leaders. Quiet set in in the barracks only after the personnel were reminded of recall by the battalion commander himself.

Such is the unique passing of the baton of responsibility which I had the occasion to see. There were so many checkers and back-ups that, as they say, the persons of the daily detail, those whose duties are set forth clearly and unambiguously in the regulations, found it difficult to raise their voices.

I became acquainted with the document which defines the legal status of the "responsible officers." It turned out that for the day Guards Lieutenant Chudinovskiy is responsible for the personnel's exact implementation of the daily schedule, for the safety and protection of weapons, for the punctual performance of duty by the daily detail, and so forth. The list I present is incomplete. I believe, and what has been said permits drawing the conclusion: duties charged by the regulations to very specific officers have been loaded on the shoulders of the "responsible officers." Why scatter responsibility? Why blame the "responsible officer" for the poorly organized recall and not the battery first sergeant on whom the regulation has placed the duty to conduct the evening check, and not the battery duty officer who, according to the regulation, is required to see to the exact accomplishment of the daily schedule in the subunit?

In the headquarters and political department of the large unit they presented me with many reasons in favor of appointing responsible officers and auxiliary duty officers. They were handsomely called the plenipotentiaries of commanders and political officers of the subunits during the night. They spoke of how the constant presence of officers in the barracks creates additional possibilities for contact with people and improving indoctrinational work.

But is it really necessary to raise an officer to the rank of "responsible officer," draw up instructions for him, and equip him with arm bands in order to assign one or another indoctrinational measure or the organization of a sports competition or excursion? And really, what is more, doesn't the Interior Service Regulation prescribe that the platoon leader should periodically attend reveille and the evening check?

The author of the letter to the editors and other officers perform duty on the daily detail three or four times per month. And if we add duty in the role of "responsible officer" to these planned, truly responsible details it comes to 11-12 duty assignments per month. Does this benefit service?

The unacceptability of the system of "responsible officers" can be seen, of course, not only in the fact that an additional load is placed on the officers. Military service never was easy and cannot be. It requires complete self-sacrifice and selflessness in deeds. But life convinces us: attention to the training of daily detail personnel and guard personnel is inevitably weakened where the solution to all problems is seen in the "responsible officers" and the authority of the noncommissioned officers drops. And if we speak in a generalized manner, the overall level of responsibility is lowered. In the unit being discussed, the number of violations of military discipline did not decrease recently, as should have been expected, but increased.

The general military regulations determine sufficiently completely the ways for the solution of all problems connected with the organization of troop service and the maintenance of high military discipline and order, and independent activity of this type is hardly capable of being of value. A much more reliable path is strict and consistent demanding of each one the exemplary execution of duties prescribed by the regulations.

Finance Officer's Deficiencies Confirmed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Mar 85 p 4

[Article: "His Own Man"]

[Text] This [His Own Man] was the title of a feuilleton by the unofficial correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Captain [remainder of rank missing] (Retired) Ye. Korovin, which was published 20 March of last year. It discussed shortcomings in the work of the chief of the Finance Service of the Black Sea Fleet, Major General V. Timoshenko, with personnel. After publication of the feuilleton contradictory responses from a number of officials reached the editors, in connection with which the newspaper was forced to publish on this question again on 20 November.

As reported to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by the member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral R. Likhvonin, the newspaper article was studied and discussed in the political directorate with the chiefs of political organs of units, in the political department of the fleet headquarters and directorates, and in the primary party organization where communist Timoshenko is registered. Special attention was devoted to raising the responsibility of political organs and party organizations for instilling in the communists-leaders lofty professional and moral qualities, implacability toward shortcomings, and a party attitude toward work with personnel.

To check the facts set forth in the newspaper, a special commission was created consisting of the chief of the political department of the headquarters and directorates of the fleet, members of the party commission with the political department of headquarters and fleet directorates, and the deputy chairman of the fleet's military tribunal. It was established that the facts occurred and the criticism was adjudged to be correct. Omissions in work with personnel were strictly pointed out to communist Timoshenko. The fleet command adopted the decision and documents were presented for the release of Major General Timoshenko to the reserve.

The collegium of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office pointed out to the first deputy military prosecutor of the Northern Fleet, Colonel of Justice A. Shabol-tanov, and the garrison military prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice N. Musiyenko, the formal approach to the checking of the facts set forth in the feuilleton "His Own Man" which led to the incorrect informing of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office and the editors.

Invention Activity Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by M. Kalashnikov, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of Lenin and State Prizes of the USSR; "Talent and Labor"]

[Text] "Can each one become an inventor?" "What is the chief criterion of technical creativity?" "Does talent or labor determine success?" "Can one doubt an invention for which an author's certificate has been issued?..." There are many such questions in the editor's mail. They are posed by young officers, warrant officers [praporshchik and michman], and cadets. Comrades G. Potapov, A. Zayets, N. Kruglov, A. Pinkov, V. Malikov, and others want to hear an authoritative opinion.

We requested the famous designer of small arms, Doctor of Technical Sciences, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, and winner of the USSR Lenin and State Prizes, Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov, to answer our readers.

Man has been inventing for a long time. In truth, the creation of the first tools of labor already began the creative process. The model of the inventor himself has already been formed by millennia. He never appeared to be such an aloof person submerged in mysterious thoughts, philosophizing on something incomprehensible and, at times not needed by anyone. This is what happened. Today some eccentric who "invents" only for the sake of inventing causes a smile and even the annoyance of the officials in the institutions whose thresholds he haunts demanding that they immediately find an application for his creation. Formally, perhaps, it even fits the formula of an invention but it has no practical value.

It is not by chance that the words "talent" and "labor" are near each other in a conversation about creativity. What is significant, original, and effective is created in a laborly search. Today any innovation as a rule proves to be "included" in operating complexes and systems of machines. This means that the author of an invention should be concerned about the compatibility of his innovation with assemblies which are already operating. Let us say that the inventor of the shovel was not required to think about its combination with the hoe or wooden plow. But the creator of a new radar antenna electric drive, for example, must proceed from weight and size characteristics and consider the parameters of the power-supply system, possible loads on the shaft, the required rate of rotation, its variations, and so forth.

What has been said pertains in full measure to invention among the troops. Here we are dealing with weapons and combat equipment systems, with systems which are complex and multifunctional, and their knowledge is a mandatory condition for effective technical creativity. A folder of queer things exists in the Invention Department of the Ministry of Defense. What isn't in it! Glass armored caps which "protect" against missiles, multibarreled pistols, and automatic rifles with barrels which are replaceable during firing.... There are similar files in the editorial offices of newspapers and technical journals. With the entire difference in the content of the documents stored there they are united by one thing: people who lay claim to an invention are not competent in the field in which they are trying to create. As a result their proposals either absolutely do not "enter" existing systems, or they are unrealizable technically, or they are considerably inferior in characteristics to those models which are already in the inventory. Nevertheless, the author demands, complains, accuses.... And it never occurred to him that the true reason for the rejection is the absence of invention style in the one who claims an author's certificate.

This example can be countered by others. There are many of them. And in each one is the creation of extremely interesting, efficient, and promising systems, instruments, circuits, and so forth which not only are not inferior in their indices to the best Soviet and foreign models but even surpass them. And all this was generated by labor and talent.

There are many examples for imitation among the young inventors of the Armed Forces. We recall the weapons of our Victory and their glorious creators--the designers of tanks, airplanes, artillery systems, submarines and surface ships.... Inscribed in gold letters in the fatherland's chronicle are the names A. Morozov,

Zh. Kotin, N. Dukhov, F. Petrov, V. Grabin, B. Shavyrin, S. Il'yushin, A. Tupolev, B. Malinin, V. Degtyarev, and other talented designers, engineers, and inventors.

During the war years, thousands of various technical proposals, innovations, and inventions reached the People's Commissariat for Defense. Their authors were servicemen, scientists, workers, engineers, and technicians who, spending sleepless nights on plans and projects, strived to do their bit in strengthening the defensive might of our motherland and in victory over the enemy.

Much has been done in the postwar years and much is being done even now. Just what determines success, what is the main thing in inventive creativity? Mental outlook, erudition, talent? Unquestionably, these qualities are necessary. But I want to dwell on one more important criterion--on the style of invention.

What is contained in this concept? First of all, style of invention requires that the innovator proceeds in his quest not from what he could do, but from what is necessary, from what comprises the urgent requirement of the unit, ship, repair subunit, metrological laboratory.... Convinced of such a necessity, he should not hurry to grab the pencil. The experienced inventor first thoroughly studies the literature on the given question--and it is fully possible that nothing must be invented since someone has already made it before him.

In beginning the development of an innovation, one should clearly formulate the final goal and soberly estimate the possibility of its attainment. For example, it is unwise to try to design a new tank or submarine alone. Tasks of this type are only within the capability of large collectives of special design offices and institutes.

If one should ask who "moves" technology, many most likely would answer--the inventors. And they would not be correct. New equipment is made by people who are not simply thoroughly trained in something. It is made by discoverers of new solutions and so, of new knowledge. Only such inventors also serve as the rungs of the ladder of progress. Selection of the point of application of force "before the wind" does not provide significant results. But here the search for the solutions of complex problems brings moral satisfaction in addition to everything else.

And one more thought. At times the existing opinion that now it is not so difficult to invent--it is sufficient only to think up something and later, with the support of various commissions and individual people, to occupy a "place of honor among the creators"--is naive to say the least.

There is the following principle: get to know--create. The thought in these words is tremendous. Only deep knowledge of a subject permits finding something new and more efficient. Can you think up some improvement to improve the work on combat equipment if you don't know this equipment to perfection yourself? Of course not.

The ability to evaluate one's plan and ways for its realization critically is also an indicator of the inventor's technical style. And if, let us say, the

first outlines for the new idea are vague and diffused, in order somehow to grasp it it would be better to discuss it collectively, with one's comrades in creative groups and to consult with specialists.

Let me note by the way that recently creative collectives and groups have become an important means for the solution of important technical tasks. Moreover, it can be said that the collaboration of specialists of various specialties permits solving problems of a systems nature and contributes to the successful struggle against so-called "petty fog."

In two words about this concept. Petty fog, that is, a mass of petty suggestions which are unable to influence substantially the improvement of some model, technological process, and so forth is engendered, on the one hand, by the impossibility of one person to solve an important technological task and, on the other, by the striving to receive the maximum number of author's certificates come what may regardless of the ponderability and utility of each of the so-called innovations. Being carried away by the quantitative aspect to the detriment of the qualitative aspect is incompatible with genuine technical creativity and its goals.

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree, "On measures to accelerate scientific and technical progress in the national economy." This document is a clear program for the creative activity of Soviet scientists, engineers, and workers in the creation and renovation of the production and scientific research potential. In implementing it in fact, many associations, enterprises, creative collectives, and individual innovators are successfully accomplishing plans in such important indices as the technical reequipping of production, a growth in the productivity of labor, a reduction in the share of manual operations, a buildup in the output of products in the highest quality category, the creation of progressive types of equipment, and so forth. And of course, success is tangible where creative activity is high: of both the leaders and the performers.

And here I should like to tell about the organizational aspect of the matter. Now it is an extremely essential part of the innovators' activity and an indicator of their inventive style. Organizer skills are needed as early as at the first stage of development--when creating the creative collective. They are required by the material and technical support of the quest, and by patent studies, by the experimental check of the model, and by designer work. Finally, by measures for the organization of the innovation's introduction into practice.

Talent and labor.... The ability to invent and create should be learned. Patiently and persistently. Designers also learn. And this helps us to look in a new manner at the problem being solved, to free ourselves from the power of old ideas, to acquire a more modern view of everything which we undertake and on which we work, and to make a more substantial contribution to the strengthening of our motherland's defensive capability.

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BRIEFS

FAILURE TO SALVAGE CRITICIZED--Dear Editors! It is with pain that we wish to share with you how vehicle equipment is written off in our subunit. It is carried to the dump where it rusts in a neglected manner. Meanwhile, many assemblies and units can be used as spare parts. But they are taken by anyone who feels like it. The scrap metal which remains is buried. We see bad management not only in this. In the shop of the vehicle equipment and operation unit the water pipe is not operating and load-lifting mechanisms and other equipment have not been installed. We posed all these problems many times for Major G. Kurochkin, Captain A. Luk'yanenko, and higher headquarters. However, rephrasing the well-known Krylov line: "The scrap is still there." [By B. Sobolev, engineer, and D. Lukibanov, aircraft mechanic, Moscow Military District] [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 85 p 3] 6367

GROUND FORCES

MOSCOW PAPER VIEWS WESTERN DEVELOPMENTS IN MINE LAYING

[PM151417 Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 1985 Second Edition publishes on Page 3 a 1,100-word TASS-attributed F. Aleksandrov "Military-technical Review" entitled "Remote Mining Systems." It describes recent Western developments in means of laying land mines by remote control for the purpose of reducing the mobility of tank and mechanized units. The report states that new low-weight antitank mines have been developed which can be scattered on the ground using towed trailers, helicopters, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems. The report concludes: "The American command does not hide the fact that the development and adoption of new types of mines and means of laying minefield barriers is one of the directions in materializing the aggressive 'air-land operation' concept directed against the USSR and the other socialist community countries."

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GROUND FORCES

BRIEFS

ARTILLERY FIRE-CONTROL: ELECTRONIC IMPROVEMENT--In the tactical exercise, the artillerymen were supporting motorized riflemen breaking through the "enemy's" defense. The battery handled the assigned mission with excellence. In the artillery firing drills, senior battery officer E. Shekhtman used an ordinary Elektronika MK-54 microcalculator. The other artillerymen followed his example. The amount of time required to prepare the data and transmit it to the strong-point in this exercise was reduced almost 4-fold as a result. The processing of the reconnaissance data and the topogeodetic survey at the commander's observation post, which was performed by Lieutenant Ye. Golomanov, was speeded up 5-fold. [by Maj P. Bykov, Red Banner Belorussian Military District] [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 85 p 1] 11499

CSO: 1801/196

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

OVERSIMPLIFICATION IN FAR EAST MD AIR COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col P. Chernenko, Red Banner Far East Military District: "And What Kind of Enemy?"]

[Text] The pilots crowd around a table on which is a large map. The mobile launcher of a missile complex is to be detected and destroyed in a given area. A lively exchange of opinions and discussion of the order for forthcoming operations is under way. An argument arises concerning where it is better to cross the "front line" to launch a precision strike.

It is well known that the truth is generated in an argument. And from the suggestions and boldness of the decisions as well as the breadth of tactical thinking one could judge that the aviators are training themselves for single combat with a strong or weak enemy. And it is very disappointing when a creative argument or search is suddenly stopped by the instruction:

"We will cross the 'front line' right here. Here we accomplish an anti-air defense maneuver, and here--an anti-fighter. You know how the targets are disposed on the range. No one has touched them. The main thing is to observe safety measures."

They say, why argue, it is all so clear. Victory is guaranteed. The main thing is that there be no risk and everyone is to operate in accordance with the scheme which was worked out long ago. We will illustrate by an example the consequences of such an approach.

A tactical flying exercise was in full swing. The fighters took off into the sky one after the other. The pilots executed interceptions with live missile launches. The weather was as if made to order: windless and sunny. Not a cloud in the sky. "Visibility--a million by a million" is what they usually say in such cases.

And here a pair consisting of Lieutenant Colonel V. Rozit and Captain V. Reshetnikov took off into the sky. Aviators who had assembled at the dynamic loudspeaker on the missile service area listened in on the radio traffic of the "ground" and the "sky." All were confident of the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission--first-class military pilots who were considered masters of combat employment climbed into the air.

At first, everything went well. The fighters reached the indicated square on time, discovered the radio-controlled target aircraft in good time, and began to close with the target. "Lock-on," Lieutenant Colonel Rozit reported to the ground. Everyone waited for the report of a victorious attack. But it did not follow. The pilot could not attack the aerial target which had begun to maneuver actively for altitude and course.

Nor did Captain Reshetnikov execute an attack although he also reached the distance necessary for opening fire in time. The fighters returned to the airfield with their missiles on board.

In the unit, the failure which overtook the pilots was evaluated as follows: they said it could happen to anyone. For prior to this, both in training air battles and on tactical flying exercises the officers operated confidently and destroyed the targets accurately. That is, they tried to "write off" the failure to chance.

The evaluation by the officers of the district's Air Force staff who attended the exercise was different. They proceeded on the basis that a situation as close as possible to the conditions of actual combat can be created only on the range where the launchings of missiles against specific aerial targets are accomplished. And Rozit and Reshetnikov, in their opinion, were not ready for operations under these conditions.

A detailed analysis showed that simplifications and indulgences had been permitted in the course of combat training in this squadron for many months. Especially during flights to intercept the aerial enemy. As a rule, the aviators accomplished the lock-on on targets and the provisional launchings of missiles only in the front or rear hemisphere. Maneuver aerial battles were seldom conducted. And the launchings of missiles from great distances were not practiced at all. And that is why Lieutenant Colonel Rozit and Captain Reshetnikov, landing in a more difficult aerial situation, could not accomplish their assigned mission.

Perhaps it would not have been worth dwelling on this case in such detail if instances of a simplified approach to the training of the aviators and the growth in their flying, firing, and tactical skill had not been encountered in several other subunits, too. How, for example, do some pilots prepare for intercepts? At first glance, thoroughly and scrupulously. They calculate everything by the minutes, think through each of their forthcoming actions in the sky and, it would appear, consider each detail. But....

Here on preliminary preparations the pilot who plays the aerial target shows the one who should intercept him his flight route and explains in detail where, when, at what altitude, and with what speed he will fly. And his teammate, in preparing to accomplish an exercise for the record, warns him of the line at which the attack will take place. In addition he also reminds him: you, he says, will not let me down; maintain the flight parameters precisely or I will suddenly bring a film which is not for the record.

And the "enemy" becomes zealous, tries not to let his comrade down, and willingly places himself under the strike, ensuring his rival victory in the air battle. And both forget that such conditions will not exist in a real air duel.

Or here is a picture that can be seen on a tactical aviation range. Prior to an exercise the commander achieves the standard disposition of the targets with enviable energy so that the squadron or regiment could work in accordance with the accustomed scheme without difficulties. That is, again counting on the enemy's placing himself under the strike without resistance.

Such an approach is impermissible. An easy time, indulgences, and simplification in any form inflict irreparable harm on the improvement of flight training. However well trained a pilot may be, if he does not learn something new in the course of training flights and tactical-flying exercises, does not encounter difficulties, and does not prepare himself for single combat with a cunning, crafty enemy he automatically stops his growth in combat skill. And to stop means to lag behind with time. This truth is also confirmed by the case which occurred with Lieutenant Colonel Rozit and his subordinate.

But why do some commanders permit simplification all the same and permit actions which are all qualified by the contemptuous word "eyewash?" The answer is simple: they are making the path to a high grade easy for themselves. And behind the high grade are reports on the successful accomplishment of obligations and honoring the "winners."

However, it is not for nothing that they say: you do not deceive yourself and life. On the very first serious test it turns out that all these "achievements" are made of whole cloth. And then it is learned that the pilots flew along routes which were "well-travelled" long ago, the tactical background was uniform....

There is no need to prove how important it is in the course of combat training to prepare oneself for single combat with a strong and skillful enemy. The frontline experience teaches us: Each encounter with the enemy in the air was for the Soviet pilot not only the greatest test of his steadfastness, boldness, and valor, but also of his skill, tactical flair, and ability to orient himself in a rapidly changing situation with lightning speed. Now, when there are modern aviation complexes and supersonic winged machines in the inventory the role and significance of these qualities have grown immeasurably. And you do not raise a genuine aerial fighter under hothouse conditions. Therefore, each strike against ground targets and each interception, be it provisional or against a real target, should be accomplished energetically, with a considerable overload envisioned by the standards, and in a difficult tactical situation.

Or take "flights" on a simulator. Even here there are large possibilities for a growth in the training of each aerial fighter. Unfortunately, frequently the leader of the lessons poses for the pilots the very same exercise setting for special situations and coordination with the command post. Such a drill is of some value for a young pilot but it provides little for an experienced aerial fighter. And for this reason, at times highly rated pilots are cool toward lessons on the simulator, which in the end has a negative effect on the growth of their skills.

At times, commanders try to violate the instructions and manuals and simplify the accomplishment of various exercises. Guidance documents, for example, envisage a check of the state of training of first-class pilots with a weather

minimum day and night. And in the air regiment where the deputy commander for flight training is Lieutenant Colonel S. Sorokin, the skill of the highly-rated pilots was usually checked under simple conditions. The regimental commander and his deputy saw nothing special in this: they say that a change in the conditions for the accomplishment of flight exercises is permitted. Unquestionably, the commander is granted the right to change the assignment with consideration of the pilot's level of preparedness. But if this is done regularly due to overcautiousness then, naturally, it reflected negatively on the growth in the combat readiness of the subunits. And as a result, the first-class pilots were unable to cope with very simple assignments because they had not fully learned to defeat a strong enemy in a very difficult tactical situation.

The requirements on the flight skill of the aviators were, are, and will always be high. Success in their realization accompanies the commander who has a high sense of responsibility for the assigned matter and excellent methodological skill and who structures the entire process of instruction based on the steady, daily growth in the training of the aerial fighters.

The air unit where the deputy commander for flight training is Lieutenant Colonel A. Mikhaylov enjoys good fame. The lessons and drills conducted here are distinguished by complexity and saturation with tactical elements of aerial battle. The regimental commander and squadron commanders are not afraid of complication of the training process in the name of the main goal—to teach the pilots to operate skillfully in any aerial situation. All flights and lessons in the classroom are organized in a well-thought-out manner and each minute of training is utilized with maximum effect. In the course of tactical quickie exercises and checking readiness for flights, the squadron commanders give varied special situations with consideration to the forthcoming assignments. They see that the pilots make a profound analysis of their possible actions in one or another battle situation and find the most advantageous maneuvers for destructive attacks. Determined right here are the most effective of them which later are checked in practice in the sky. And it is not by chance that the majority of the regiment's pilots are genuine masters of combat employment who always accomplish the most difficult missions successfully in the sky.

Despite difficult weather conditions, flights during the winter training period are distinguished by saturation and intensity. Tactical flying exercises are in full swing. What is the tactical background of these exercises? On what "enemy" is the estimate based? What do the aviators obtain that is new and with what do they enrich their knowledge and skills? The answer to these questions depends on with how much initiative and how creatively the pilots and commanders of flights, detachments, squadrons, and regiments approach the organization of the training of each of them and how actively the aviators struggle against simplification, indulgences and "eyewash" in the course of the exercises.

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CSO: 1801/186

13 June 1985

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AERIAL NEAR-MISS LAID TO PRE-FLIGHT PLAN, GROUND CONTROLLER

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 85 p. 2

[Article by Maj G. Torzhok, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "For Flight Safety: There Didn't Have to be Any Preconditions"]

[Text] After executing the mission, Lt Col V. Gnatkovski turned the aircraft to the return course. He entered the holding area before landing in order to use up excess fuel. There was clear sky ahead and the even line of the horizon could be seen clearly. All at once a fighter appeared suddenly on a collision course. It seemed about to ram the winged craft. Fortunately this didn't happen.

And so a dangerous near-miss of two aircraft occurred in the air. The decision was made in the regiment at once that the pilot from the other unit had committed a gross error. He allegedly had not maintained his altitude or flight course.

But it was learned during a detailed critique of the incident that both pilots were following courses plotted on maps back on the ground. They also were adhering strictly to the flight altitude. Nevertheless, their routes intersected. This means the precondition for a flying incident had been "programmed" back in the process of preparing for the sortie on the ground. Lt Col Gnatkovski made the first mistake. Prior to the flights, he (senior navigator of the regiment) made a very superficial analysis of the air situation. During pre-flight instructions he had not informed the aviators of the flight routes and altitudes of other aircraft. This is to say that the near-miss didn't occur by accident. It was the result of insufficient quality in navigation support to flights.

A detailed critique of the incident also suggested that flight controller Lt Col N. Velyukhanov and his assistants were not equal to the occasion. They satisfied themselves with incomplete information about air traffic. The air situation was not reflected as prescribed on appropriate plotting boards. Tactical control officer Capt A. Poltavtsev and landing controller Capt V. Makhinenko did not use radar assets for detecting the unidentified target. The fact is that had one of them displayed vigilance and noticed the blip on the radar screen from the target flying by, the flight controller would have had time to shift Gnatkovski's crew to another flight altitude. Deficiencies in organization of flight preparations and in controlling the flights were the reason for the dangerous convergence of the combat craft in the air.

Here I would like to say the following. Such a precondition for a flying incident occurred somewhat earlier in the neighboring regiment. They didn't try to explain what happened there by the youth and inexperience of Lt Ye. Rybachenok; they pointed out the deficiencies directly: the flight controller and tactical control officer committed gross errors. The subunit where Lt Rybachenok flies took decisive steps to eradicate the violation of demands of documents regulating flight safety. But people in the regiment where Lt Col Gnatkovskiy serves merely took what happened for information. The aviators did not think about how to prevent similar mistakes in their own unit, reasoning that the dangerous near-miss was a rarity, that there had not been such a thing in the regiment for a long while, and so was it worthwhile talking about it? And here was the result.

Our district aviation has many subunits which make thoughtful use of the foremost experience of neighbors and which carefully analyze omissions in the organization of other subunits' flying work. This permits quality execution of all flight missions and reliable assurance of flight safety. Take the excellent squadron commanded by 1st Class military pilot Lt Col V. Lar'kov. The aviators here have no preconditions for flying incidents. Nevertheless, they carefully analyzed the incident involving Lt Rybachenok and outlined specific steps to prevent similar mistakes. Supplementary classes for studying appropriate points of the instructions and manuals were organized with the air warriors here. The interworking of pilots with officers of the flight control group was practiced during comprehensive training sessions. In short, the dangerous near-misses of aircraft in the air which occurred in the neighboring unit were an impetus for serious and very useful preventive work in the foremost subunit.

Excellent flight training and the discipline of air warriors, professional expertise of flight control officials, each aviator's sense of high personal responsibility for flight safety, and an ability to learn from others' mistakes represent a reliable guarantee for preventing preconditions for flying incidents. It is a simple and seemingly understandable truth. It is only a pity that it is scorned in some places.

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CSO: 1801/192

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

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CSO: 1801/186

JPRS-UMA-85-037
13 June 1985

NAVAL FORCES

BRIEFS

HELICOPTER RECONNAISSANCE FOR 'KIEV'--CAPT 1st Rank G. Yasnitskiy, commander of the aircraft carrying cruiser "Kiev," was assigned the mission of destroying the main target in the detachment of "enemy" combat ships. The next pair of deck-based helicopters immediately took to the air. One of them was piloted by Lieutenant Colonel I. Cheberyachenko, pilot 1st class. Lieutenant Colonel I. Cheberyachenko holds the orders of the Red Star and "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3d degree. He has more than 2,500 hours of flight time. Officer A. Yelovikov, navigator and specialist 1st class, has approximately the same number. The helicopter pilots were to fly to the area where the "enemy" ships were located and transmit firing data to the "Kiev." By maintaining radio silence and flying at low altitudes, the veteran helicopter pilots succeeded in reconnoitering the surface situation in the area by radar and transmitting the necessary information. A brilliant flame soon flared up on board the ship: a missile had been launched. It struck the target precisely. [By Capt Lt V. Pasyakin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, from the cruiser "Kiev"] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 85 p 1] 11499

CSO: 1801/196

DOSAAF

SESSION OF STANDING COMMISSION OF DOSAAF CC

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 27 Mar 85 p 2

[Article: "Standing Commission Sessions: Implement Foremost Experience!"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Sessions were held by standing commissions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. They discussed problems of a further improvement in effectiveness and quality of military-patriotic, mass defense, training and sports work of DOSAAF organizations in light of demands of the March 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Recommendations were adopted for DOSAAF committees, school chiefs and STK's [sports-technical clubs] on matters of generalizing and adopting the experience of competition leaders and remedying deficiencies in propaganda and organizational work.

The session of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Standing Commission FOR MASS ORGANIZATIONAL WORK discussed ways of improving the work of selection, training and indoctrination of cadres and the public aktiv.

Reports were given by V. Lun'kov, chairman of the Chechen-Ingush DOSAAF obkom; Kh. Vologirov, chairman of the Kabardino-Balkar DOSAAF obkom; Yu. Konev, chairman of the Krasnoyarsk DOSAAF kraykom; V. Katayev, chairman of the Altay DOSAAF kraykom; and A. Babokhin, deputy chairman of the Belorussian DOSAAF Central Committee.

Commission members took note of the experience gained by DOSAAF committees of Latvian SSR, where the make-up of the principal component of management cadres has improved in recent years and where much attention is being given to the practical training of workers and activists right on the spot.

At the same time, the speakers emphasized that in a number of defense organizations the status of work to increase the responsibility of cadres and the public aktiv for the assigned job still does not meet modern demands, and committee chairmen of primary organizations, raykoms and gorkoms are receiving insufficiently effective help.

The commission approved the work plan for the current year, which provides for a study of the experience of work by some DOSAAF committees in the management of corresponding auditing commissions and in teaching them the practice of supervisory and auditing work.

The commission FOR MILITARY-PATRIOTIC PROPAGANDA discussed the briefing by A. Mikheyev, chairman of the Bryansk Oblast DOSAAF committee, about the experience of work by Defense Society committees in improving joint work with organizations of the "Znaniye" Society in military-patriotic propaganda and in disseminating military and military-technical knowledge.

The briefing noted in part that joint work of DOSAAF organizations and the "Znaniye" Society in military-patriotic propaganda stepped up noticeably in the period of preparations for the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. Lectures and briefings, meetings between young people and frontlinesmen, theme nights and other activities devoted to the glorious date are held regularly. DOSAAF committees have begun to coordinate work plans better with organizations of the "Znaniye" Society. A practical science conference entitled "40th Anniversary of the Great Victory and Current Issues of Military-Patriotic Indoctrination" was conducted through joint efforts.

L. Tsukerman, chairman of the Khabarovsk Kray DOSAAF committee; K. Plakunov, chairman of the Volgograd Oblast DOSAAF committee; and F. Sergeyev, deputy chairman of the Yakutsk Oblast DOSAAF committee, spoke in the discussion period on an exchange of work experience.

The commission session also took note of deficiencies in the work of DOSAAF committees in military-patriotic propaganda. The theoretical and methods level of some seminars for propagandists does not always meet modern demands. Lecture propaganda is insufficiently prompt in taking account of features of the present-day international situation and the tasks of strengthening counterpropaganda, exposing the aggressive course of the United States and other NATO countries, and instilling a class hatred toward imperialism. The opportunities for expanding propaganda of military-technical knowledge are not being fully used.

Pedagogic councils and subject commissions of DOSAAF schools have an important role to play in improving the training and indoctrination process, improving the methods training of instructors and masters, and introducing foremost experience to the practice of training and indoctrinating draftees. Their work was discussed at the session of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Standing Commission FOR PREPARATION OF THE YOUTH FOR SERVICE IN THE USSR ARMED FORCES.

The briefing by N. Matsak, chairman of the Semipalatinsk Oblast committee of the Society, covered the work experience of the pedagogic council of the Semipalatinsk Joint Technical School. I. Gladen'kiy, chairman of the Kirovograd Oblast DOSAAF committee, told how the committee generalizes and disseminates positive elements in the work of pedagogic councils and subject commissions of the Defense Society's schools, how it uncovers the reasons for omissions in their work and how it helps remedy them.

Pedagogic councils and subject commissions work purposefully and thoughtfully in the Taganrog Motor Vehicle School (the chief is Yu. Buvalko) and the Brest Joint Technical School (the chief is A. Kozik).

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Standing Commission FOR PROPAGANDA OF MILITARY-TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE AND TRAINING CADRES OF MASS TECHNICAL TRADES FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY discussed the briefing by A. Malikov, chairman of the Lipetsk Oblast DOSAAF committee, about improving the training facility for teaching specialists of the mass technical trades. Classrooms in the schools are well equipped with visual aids and technical training means, but the training facility in a majority of STK's does not meet modern demands.

Commission members N. Vereshchagin, Zh. Veshnyakov and F. Sidorov gave a positive assessment of the foremost experience and spoke of ways to remedy the deficiencies in training technical specialists for the national economy.

The regular session of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Standing Commission FOR DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL AND APPLIED MILITARY SPORTS examined aspects of the further popularization of shooting sports. In his briefing, A. Purakhin, chief of the Sports-Technical and Shooting Clubs Department of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Technical and Applied Military Sports Directorate, told about the tasks at hand today and how they will be accomplished in the near future.

Ye. Khaydurov, well-known Soviet designer of small arms for sports, familiarized commission members with promising developments for the next few years. Commission members I. Vinogradov (chairman of the Mari Oblast DOSAAF committee), V. Yevstiferov (chief of the DOSAAF Central Sport Shooting Club), I. Tyukhanov (chairman of Crimea Oblast DOSAAF committee), and others who spoke in the discussion period noted the insufficiently broad development of shooting sports in schools, PTU's [vocational-technical schools] and tekhnikums. Inasmuch as that situation is caused by the difficulty of storing small-caliber arms, it was recommended that more attention be given to shooting air rifles.

The question was considered about the need to publish visual training aids, methods elaborations, posters for mass training in rifle shooting, as well as certain others.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Standing Commission FOR WORK WITH YOUNG STUDENTS, PUPILS AND TEENAGERS discussed the question of joint work by DOSAAF committees with trade unions, the Komsomol and organs of public education, internal affairs, and housing and municipal services to improve work with teenagers at the place of residence.

Briefings were given by DOSAAF obkom chairmen V. Zhukov (Yaroslavl), D. Nagimov (Tashauz) and I. Ponomarev (Saratov). They shared experience in organizing indoctrinational work with teenagers at the place of residence.

The commission noted that DOSAAF committees had activated participation somewhat of late in indoctrinating teenagers at the place of residence. At the same time, this work still had not received proper scope and teenagers to a considerable extent were not yet accustomed to activities in technical and applied military sports.

A joint session of standing commissions FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE MATERIAL-TECHNICAL FACILITY IN DOSAAF ORGANIZATIONS AND FOR ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION WORK OF DEFENSE SOCIETY ENTERPRISES discussed the status of the introduction and mastery of new production capacities at DOSAAF enterprises.

Briefings were given by A. Klevtsov, general director of the Leningrad Patriot Production Association, and L. Shakha, chief engineer of the DOSAAF Gomel Sports Model-Building and Training Aids Plant.

In addition to positive points, serious deficiencies were noted in providing for the introduction and mastery of capacities at DOSAAF enterprises. For example, a serious situation had shaped up with the placement of a new building at the Gomel Plant into operation.

Deputy chairmen of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and heads of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee directorates spoke at sessions of the commissions.

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CSO: 1801/192

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

JPRS-UMA-85-037
13 June 1985

ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY SCHOOLS

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 85 p 4

[Article: "Rules for Acceptance to Military Educational Institutions"]

[Text] Higher military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense are accepting warrant officers and midshipmen; first term servicemen as well as reenlistees; military construction personnel; young civilians; reservists who still have a military obligation; graduates of the Suvorov Military Academy, the Nakhimov Naval Academy, and the Moscow Military Band Academy; who possess a complete secondary (or secondary specialized) education; who are acceptable in terms of health, to include their psychological profile; who are physically prepared for training at military educational institutions; and who have passed the entrance examination on general educational subjects.

Warrant officers and midshipmen are accepted after two years service in the rank of warrant officer or midshipman, or at officers duties; and reenlistees, after they've completed two years of service on their second tour. Reservists who still have a military obligation are accepted if they are no more than 23 years old. Reenlistees are accepted regardless of which military specialty they hold and term of service (except for the higher military-political schools, which do not accept servicemen who have served less than one year); young civilian men are accepted between ages 17-21.

First term servicemen and young civilian men are accepted at higher military-political academies upon recommendation from the appropriate political authorities of the Soviet Army and Navy or, from the raykom (or gorkom) of the CPSU (or Komsomol).

Those persons who are eligible for higher military educational institutions are also eligible for secondary military schools (except for warrant officers and midshipmen).

The age of those admitted for training is defined as that reached on 31 December, and the period of service, as of 1 September of the year of admission.

Warrant officers, midshipmen, first-term servicemen and reenlistees who wish to apply to military educational institutions submit the application by order, in the name of the commander of the military unit, prior to 1 May;

Young civilian men and persons with a military obligation submit an application to the rayon (city) military commissariat where they live, prior to 1 June of the year of admission.

Indicated on the application are: military rank, last name, first name, patronymic, duty position occupied, year and month of birth, education, name of the military educational institute (department, or specialty) to which the serviceman desires admission. Attached to the application are: copies of documents on education, party (for CPSU members and candidate CPSU members) or Komsomol (for Komsomol members) records, three certified photos (without headgear, in size 4.5 x 6.0 cm), personal performance records, an autobiography, and the service card. The original document on education is presented to the acceptance commission upon arrival at its place of work.

The application of young civilians (and persons with a military obligation) contains: last name, first name, patronymic; year and month of birth; home address; and name of the military educational institute (or department) to which the person desires entrance. Attached to the application are: an autobiography; a performance record from one's place of work or studies in accordance with the Rules for Acceptance; a party (for CPSU members or candidate members) or a Komsomol performance record (for Komsomol members); a copy of the document on secondary education (students at secondary schools submit a certificate of current progress); and three photos (without headgear, 4.5 x 6 cm).

The candidate presents his ID card, service record or certificate of registration, and the original document on secondary education, to the acceptance commission at the educational institute upon arrival.

Candidates who apply to military educational institutes undergo professional selection, which includes an evaluation of one's socio-political activity and moral qualities; one's state of health including a psychological profile; one's physical preparedness and general educational preparedness.

The evaluation of one's general educational preparedness is conducted: in the majority of the higher military institutes--on Russian language and literature (written), on mathematics, physics, and the history of the USSR; at secondary military schools--on Russian language and literature (written) and on mathematics. Examinations, the form of administration of which is not indicated, are administered orally.

Admitted without testing their knowledge on general educational subjects, provided the applicant meets all other requirements for professional selection, are: Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor; servicemen and persons with a service obligation which have been decorated with the orders and medals of the USSR (For Gallantry; the Order of Ushakov; For Military Merit; the Order of Nakhimov), for distinguished service in combat operations in defense of the USSR and in carrying out one's international obligations. Also admitted without examination are graduates of the Suvorov Military Academy and the Nakhimov Naval Academy--to military academies and military institutes; also persons who graduated from secondary school with a gold medal or from a secondary special educational institute with a diploma cum laude--to military aviation-technical schools. Also

considered for entry to higher and secondary military schools and military institutes without testing their knowledge on general educational subjects, are persons who have completed the first or subsequent courses at civilian VUZ's in specialties which correspond to the profile of a given military educational institution, provided they meet the other requirements for professional selection. These persons may be enrolled in the first course after an appropriate interview.

Those servicemen who have displayed high moral and fighting qualities in the defense of the USSR and in carrying out their international obligations; first term servicemen and reenlistees who are rated outstanding in combat and political training, with published orders from their military unit to that effect; candidates who have graduated from an educational institution with a gold medal or with a diploma cum laude, or who have received a grade of 5 (five) on the entrance examination for the type of discipline; and who receive passing scores on general educational subjects, are not required to compete for professional selection.

After the enrollment of candidates who have the right to admission without taking entrance examinations or participating in competition, the candidates who are left must compete for the remaining vacancies. During the competition, consideration is given to socio-political activeness, moral qualities, state of health to include the psychological profile, the level of physical preparedness, and general educational preparedness.

Acceptance commissions for military educational institutions carry out their work for professional selection of candidates for studies from 10 through 30 July. The work period for traveling acceptance commissions is 5 through 25 June; and for republic acceptance commissions, from 5 through 25 July.

Commanders of military units, and rayon (city) military commissariats are responsible for sending the candidates to the work places of the acceptance commissions.

All candidates arriving at military educational institutions are furnished free lodging in a dormitory (barracks) and free textbooks and literature; while candidates who are first term servicemen and young civilian men are, in addition, furnished free board in accordance with established norms.

Detailed information on military educational institutions and the Rules for Acceptance may be obtained at headquarters of military units or at military commissariats.

9006

CSO: 1801/187

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

LIST OF MILITARY SCHOOLS PUBLISHED

Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian 27 Feb 85 p 3

[Article: "To Those Who Wish to Continue Their Studies at Military Schools"]

[Text] Thousands of young men are now faced with choosing a profession. The preparation and training of officers has always been and is today the focus of special attention by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, because it is one of the more important issues in our military organization. In the Soviet Union, where the army and the navy are enshrined by nationwide esteem, every opportunity has been taken to steadily increase the social prestige of the military calling. Universal conscription is the law here, but military service in our armed forces is the respectful duty of USSR citizens. The USSR law of universal conscription therefore opens up a broad vista for those young men who select a career for themselves as staff officers in our army and navy. Every opportunity has been taken in the military schools to master a suitable military specialty. The cadets have at their disposal the newest combat technology and weaponry, classrooms and laboratories equipped at the modern level, automated artillery ranges, contemporary sports complexes and well-stocked libraries. The cadets are instructed and trained by teachers with considerable experience. Lectures and seminars, classes on the artillery and rifle ranges, at the tankodrome and autodrome, on the drill field and in the athletic hall, participation in drills, maneuvers and sea voyages, the first independent flights in a fighter plane--all this makes the studies strenuous and various and requires the application of all one's powers and constant self-command.

During the years of study, the cadets acquire all the knowledge and skills which are necessary to become the leader and commander of a military collective, someone who is competent to carry out any combat assignment whatsoever. Together with his first lieutenant stripes and a diploma of advanced military training, each graduate also obtains the right to teach and train his own subordinates.

If you have positively decided to choose the manly profession of staff officer, then direct your steps to the local military commissariat. However, we here give a list of the military schools where you could continue your studies.

Political Military Schools

Donetsk Political Staff College for Engineers and Signal Corpsmen;

Kiev Political Staff College for Naval Forces;

Kurgan Political Staff College for Air Forces;

J. Andropov Political Staff College for Antiaircraft Personnel in Leningrad;

Lvov Political Staff College of the Order of the Red Star;

Minsk Political Staff College for General Forces;

Sixtieth Anniversary of the Great October Political Staff College for General Forces in Novosibirsk;

USSR Marshal S. Biryuzov Political Staff College of the Order of the Red Flag in Riga;

L. Brezhnev Political Staff College for Tank and Artillery Personnel in Sverdlovsk;

Simferopol Political Staff College for Military Construction;

Tallinn Political Staff College for Military Construction.

The political military schools prepare political workers/officers with special, advanced military training for all branches of the armed forces. The Lvov military school prepares officers with advanced training: military journalists and cultural/educational workers.

Applicants are accepted at the political military schools on the basis of letters of command from the Komsomol's rayon or municipal committee.

The training period at political military schools is 4 years.

Schools for General Forces

USSR Marshal I. Konev Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces in Alma-Ata;

Azerbaijani SSR Supreme Soviet Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces in Baku;

USSR Marshal K. Rokossovskiy Far East Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces;

M. Frunze Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces of the Order of the Two Red Flags in Kiev;

S. Kirov Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces of the Order of the Two Red Flags in Leningrad;

Russian SFSR Supreme Soviet Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces of the Order of Lenin, October Revolution and Red Flag in Moscow;

M. Frunze Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces of the Order of the Two Red Flags in Omsk;

USSR Marshal A. Yeryomenko Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces of the Order of the Two Red Flags in Ordzhonikidze;

V. Lenin Staff College for Management Personnel of General Forces of the Order of the Red Flag and Red Star in Tashkent.

The schools for the management personnel of general forces prepare the officers of motorized sharpshooters. The training period in management personnel schools is 4 years.

Graduates of the staff colleges for management personnel of general forces are accredited with the qualification of maintenance engineer for caterpillar and mounted vehicles and of officer with advanced military training.

Schools for Tank Forces

USSR Marshal K. Meretskov Staff College for Management Personnel of Tank Forces of the Order of the Red Flag in Blagoveshchensk;

Tatar ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Staff College for Management Personnel of Tank Forces of the Order of the Red Flag in Kazan;

USSR Marshal I. Jakubovskiy Staff College for Tank Force Engineers of the Order of the Red Star in Kiev;

USSR Marshal P. Koshevoi Staff College for Tank Force Engineers of the Order of the Red Star in Omsk;

Two-Time USSR Hero Tank Force Marshal P. Rybalko Staff College for Management Personnel of Tank Forces of the Order of Lenin in Tashkent;

V. Lenin Staff College for Management Personnel of Guardsman Tank Forces of the Order of the Red Flag and Red Star in Ulyanovsk;

Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Staff College for Management Personnel of Guardsman Tank Forces of the Order of the Red Star in Kharkov;

Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Staff College for Management Personnel of Tank Forces in Chelyabinsk.

The schools for tank forces prepare officers of tank forces. The training period in schools for management personnel is 4 years, in the Kiev and Omsk schools for tank force engineers 5 years.

Graduates of the staff colleges for management personnel of tank forces are accredited with the qualification of maintenance engineer for caterpillar and mounted vehicles and of officer with advanced military training. Graduates of the school for tank force engineers receive the title of engineer in the corresponding specialty.

Artillery Schools

October Revolution Staff College for Management Personnel of Artillery of the Order of Lenin and the Red Flag in Kolomna;

M. Frunze Staff College for Management Personnel of Artillery of the Order of Lenin in Odessa;

Chief Artillery Marshal N. Voronov Staff College for Artillery Engineers of the Order of the Red Star in Penza;

M. Frunze Staff College for Management Personnel of Artillery of the Order of the Two Red Flags in Sumy;

Twenty-Sixth Baku Commissar Staff College for Management Personnel of Artillery of the Order of the Red Flag and Red Star in Tbilisi;

Tula Proletariat Staff College for Artillery Engineers of the Order of Lenin and the October Revolution in Tula;

Chmelnitsk Staff College for Management Personnel of Artillery.

The training period is 5 years at the Penza and Tula schools for artillery engineers, 4 years at the others. The schools' graduates receive the title of military engineer in the corresponding specialty.

Schools for Air Defense Forces

Vilnius Staff College of Radio Electronics for Management Personnel of Air Defense Forces;

Gorkiy Staff College for Management Personnel of Air Defense Rocket Forces;

Dnepropetrovsk Staff College for Management Personnel of Air Defense Rocket Forces;

Leninist Komsomol Staff College of Radio Electronics of the Order of the October Revolution and the Red Flag in Zhitomer;

S. Kirov Staff College for Air Defense Rocket Engineers of the Order of Lenin and the Red Flag in Kiev;

Kiev Staff College for Radio Engineers of Air Defense Forces;

Krasnoyarsk Staff College of Radio Electronics for Management Personnel of Air Defense Forces;

Sixtieth Anniversary of the Great October Staff College for Management Personnel of Air Defense Rocket Forces of the Order of the Red Star in Leningrad;

Minsk Staff College for Air Defense Rocket Engineers;

Army General I. Pliev Staff College for Management Personnel of Air Defense Rocket Forces in Ordzhonikidze;

Pushkin Staff College of Radio Electronics for Air Defense Forces of the Order of the Red Star;

G. Ordzhonikidze Staff College for Management Personnel of Rocket Forces of the Order of the Red Flag in Orenburg;

Army General N. Vatutin Staff College for Management Personnel of Rocket Forces of the Order of the Red Flag in Poltava;

Smolensk Staff College for Rocket Engineers;

Air Force Marshal V. Sudets Staff College for Military Pilots in Stavropol;

Engels Staff College for Management Personnel of Air Defense Rocket Forces;

Sixtieth Anniversary of the Great October Staff College for Management Personnel of Air Defense Rocket Forces in Yaroslavl.

The schools for air defense forces prepare officers for all branches of the air defense forces. The training period at the engineering schools and in the engineering departments of the Zhitomir and Pushkin schools is 5 years, at the other schools 4 years.

Graduates are assigned the title of officer with special military training and correspondingly that of radio engineer, radio electronics engineer or pilot/engineer.

Air Force Schools

Armavir Staff College for Military Pilots of the Order of the Red Flag;

Chief Air Force Marshal A. Novikov Staff College for Military Pilots in Balashov;

Air Force Marshal K. Vershinin Staff College for Military Pilots in Barnaul;

V. Chkalov Staff College for Military Pilots of the Order of Lenin and the Red Flag in Borisoglebsk;

Voronezh Staff College for Flight Engineers;

Donbass Proletariat Staff College for Flight Navigators in Voroshilovgrad;

J. Fabricius Staff College for Flight Engineers in Daugavpils;

Two-Time USSR Hero Cosmonaut V. Komarov Staff College for Military Pilots of the Order of Lenin in Yeisk;

All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League's 50th Anniversary Staff College for Flight Engineers of the Order of the Red Star in Irkutsk;

A. Myasnikov Staff College for Military Pilots of the Order of Lenin and the Red Flag in Katsha;

Kiev Staff College for Flight Engineers;

I. Polbin Staff College for Military Pilots of the Order of the Red Flag in Orenburg;

J. Alksnis Staff College for Flight Engineers in Riga;

Saratov Staff College for Military Pilots;

Syzran Staff College for Military Pilots;

F. Dzerzhinskiy Staff College for Flight Engineers of the Order of Lenin and the Red Flag in Tambov;

M. Raskov Staff College for Military Pilots in Tambov;

Kharkov Staff College for Flight Engineers of the Order of the Red Flag;

Ukrainian Leninist Komsomol Staff College of Air Force Radio Electronics in Kharkov;

Two-Time USSR Hero S. Gritsevets Staff College for Military Pilots of the Order of the Red Star in Kharkov;

All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League's 50th Anniversary School for Air Force Navigators of the Order of the Red Flag in Chelyabinsk;

Leninist Komsomol Staff College for Military Pilots in Chernigov.

The training period at the staff colleges for military pilots and air force navigators, at the Kharkov radio electronics school and the Voronezh engineering school is 4 years; at other staff colleges of engineering and in the meteorology department of the Voronezh engineering school, 5 years. Graduates receive the title of engineer/pilot, engineer/navigator or engineer in the corresponding specialty.

Young men can also receive military training at special air force educational institutes. Graduates of these schools are assigned the military rank of lieutenant of technical service--suitable to the all-union form--with the profession of mechanical, electrical or electromechanical technician.

Those who wish can enter the following technical air force schools:

All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League's 60th Anniversary Technical Air Force School in Achinsk;

Ukrainian Leninist Komsomol's 50th Anniversary Technical Air Force School in Vassilkov;

Kaliningrad Technical Air Force School;

Kirov Technical Air Force School;

Leninist Komsomol Technical Air Force School in Perm.

The training period at the technical air force schools is 3 years. During this time, the cadets receive knowledge of higher mathematics, materials strength science, technical drawing, etc.

Naval Schools

M. Frunze Staff Naval College of the Order of Lenin, the Red Flag and Ushakov;

Leninist Komsomol Staff Submarine College;

F. Dzerzhinskiy Staff College of Naval Engineering of the Order of Lenin;

A. Popov Staff College of Naval Radio Electronics;

Kaliningrad Staff Naval College;

S. Kirov Caspian Staff Naval College of the Order of the Red Flag;

V. Lenin Staff College of Naval Engineering in Leningrad;

Sevastopol Staff College of Naval Engineering;

S. Makarov Pacific Ocean Staff Naval College;

P. Nakhimov Black Sea Staff Naval College of the Order of the Red Star;

The training period in all the naval schools is 5 years. Graduates are assigned the title of naval engineer in the corresponding specialty.

Signal Corps Schools

Voronezh Staff College for Radio Electronic Engineers;

Kemerovo Staff College for Signal Corps Management Personnel;

M. Kalinin Staff College for Signal Corps Engineers of the Order of the Two Red Flags in Kiev;

Leningrad Staff College for Signal Corps Engineers;

USSR Marshal V. Sokolovsk Staff College for Signal Corps Management Personnel of the Order of the Red Flag in Novocherkassk;

M. Kalinin Staff College for Signal Corps Management Personnel in Oryol;

Poltava Staff College for Signal Corps Management Personnel;

USSR Marshal M. Zakharov Staff College for Signal Corps Management Personnel in Ryazan;

Sixtieth Anniversary of the Great October Staff School for Signal Corps Engineers in Stavropol;

Tomsk Staff College for Signal Corps Management Personnel of the Order of the Red Star;

G. Ordzhonikidze Staff College for Signal Corps Management Personnel of Ulyanovsk;

Cherepovets Staff College for Radio Electronic Engineers.

The training period in all the management personnel schools is 4 years, in the engineering schools 5 years.

Schools for Engineering Management Personnel

Artillery Marshal M. Chistyakov Staff College for Military Engineers in Kazan;

Krasnodar Staff College for Engineering Management Personnel;

USSR Marshal V. Chuikov Staff College for Engineering Management Personnel of the Order of the Red Flag in Perm;

Chief Artillery Marshal M. Nedelin Staff College for Engineering Management Personnel in Rostov;

USSR Hero Major General A. Lizyukov Staff College for Management Personnel of the Order of the Red Flag and Red Star in Saratov;

Leninist Komsomol Staff College for Engineering Management Personnel in Serpukhov;

USSR Marshal N. Krylov Staff College for Engineering Management Personnel in Kharkov.

The training period is 5 years in all the schools for engineering management personnel. The schools' graduates receive special military training and the title of engineer in the corresponding area.

Engineer Corps Schools

A. Zhdanov Staff College for Engineer Corps of the Order of Lenin and the Red Flag in Kaliningrad;

Engineer Corps Marshal V. Kharchenko Staff College for Engineer Corps Management Personnel in Kamenets-Podolsk;

Engineer Corps Marshal A. Proshlyakov Staff College for Engineer Corps Management Personnel in Tyumen.

The training period in all engineer corps schools is 5 years. The schools' graduates are accredited with the title of military engineer in the corresponding specialty.

Chemical Corps Schools

Kostroma Staff College for Chemical Corps Management Personnel;

Saratov Staff College for Chemical Corps Engineers;

Tambov Staff College for Chemical Corps Management Personnel of the Order of the Red Flag;

The training period at the schools for chemical corps engineers is 5 years, at the management personnel schools 4 years.

Rearguard Service Schools

Leninist Komsomol Staff College of Rearguard Service of the Order of the Red Star in Volsk.

The training period is 4 years. Graduates receive the title of economic engineer.

Gorkiy Staff College of Rearguard Service.

The training period is 4-5 years depending on the specialty. The school's graduates receive the title of economic, mechanical or technological engineer.

M. Frunze Staff College for Railway Personnel of the Order of Lenin and the Red Flag in Leningrad.

The training period is 4 years in the departments of management personnel, 5 years in the engineering departments.

Bogdan Chmel'nitskiy Technical Staff College in Ulyanovsk.

Prepares specialists in the use, storage and transportation of liquid fuel. The training period is 4-5 years in accordance with the chosen specialty.

Army General A. Chrulyov Staff College of Financial Service of the Order of the Red Star in Yaroslavl.

The school prepares officers with special military training in financial service for all branches of the USSR armed forces. The training period is 4 years.

Military Construction Schools

Army General A. Komarovskiy Staff College of Civil Engineering of the Order of the Red Flag in Leningrad;

Pushkin Staff College of Civil Engineering;

Kamyshin Staff College for Construction Management Personnel;

Gorkiy Staff College for Construction Management Personnel;

Togliatti Staff College for Construction Management Personnel.

The training period is 5 years at the engineering schools, 4 years at the management personnel schools.

Schools for Automotive Forces

Ryazan Staff College for Automotive Engineers of the Order of the Red Star;

Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Staff College for Automotive Management Personnel in Samarkand;

Ussuriysk Staff College for Automotive Management Personnel;

Chief Tank Forces Marshal P. Rotmistrov Staff College for Automotive Engineers in Chelyabinsk.

The training period at the engineering schools is 5 years, at management personnel schools 4 years.

Military Institutes

A. Mozhaitskiy Military Engineering Institute of the Order of the Red Flag in Leningrad.

Prepares military engineers. Graduates receive the title of mechanical, electrical, hydrometeorological, civil, radio and radioelectronic engineer. The training period at the institute is 5 years.

Military Institute of the Order of the Red Flag in Moscow.

Applicants are accepted for the specialty of interpreter, for the military/political department and for the legal department. The training period in the special field of interpreting and in the military/political department is 5 years, in the legal department 4 years.

Military Institute of Physical Culture of the Order of the Two Red Flags in Leningrad.

The training period is 4 years. The graduates receive advanced preparation in military physical culture and sports.

Conditions for Acceptance

Accepted at all the educational institutes of our armed forces are young men 17 to 21 years of age and conscripts up to the age of 23 who have completed active service and who have a high school education (or special high school education), whose state of health--including psychological prerequisites and physical training--allows them to continue their studies in military educational institutes and who successfully pass the appropriate entrance examinations.

Those who wish to enter military schools submit--by 1 June at the latest--an application to the military commissariat of the local rayon or city. Indicated on the application are the surname, forename and patronymic, date of birth, home address and the name of the educational institute one wants to enter to study. Appended to the application are a biography, a characterization of workplace or educational institute, party or Komsomol characterization, a copy of the document certifying high school education (students in the final year of high school: a certificate of current scholastic progress) and three photographs (without headgear, 4.5 x 6 centimeters).

Members of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League who enter military schools on the recommendation of a rayon or city committee of the Estonian Leninist Communist Youth League add to the documents a letter of command from the Komsomol in accordance with the all-union form. All documents are drawn up in Russian.

Passport, military card or testimonial to be given consideration, birth certificate and original of document affirming high school education are submitted to the republic's acceptance committee upon arrival for the entrance examinations.

All candidates pass in front of the appropriate selection committee, which evaluates their sociopolitical activity and moral qualities, state of health, psychological prerequisites, physical preparation and general knowledge.

General educational preparation is evaluated on the basis of the entrance examinations, which consist of the following subjects:

--at the higher political and military schools and the Army General A. Chrulyov Staff College of Financial Service of the Order of the Red Star in Yaroslavl:

Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, geography and history of the USSR.

Those entering the Lvov Staff College take an oral examination in Russian language and literature--instead of a mathematics examination--and undergo an interview in a selected special subject.

--at the staff colleges of management personnel and engineering management personnel, at the engineering schools, at the military pilot and navigator schools, at other educational institutions, at the A. Mozhaitskiy Military Engineering Institute: Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, physics and history of the USSR.

At the staff colleges for the chemical corps and the rearguard service and at the Bogdan Chmelnytsky Staff College in Ulyanovsk, the entrance examinations are taken in Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, chemistry and history of the USSR.

Candidates who wish to enter the Military Institute take examinations in Russian language (oral and written), a foreign language and USSR history, those who enter the Military Institute of Physical Culture, however, in Russian language (written), USSR history, biology and practical tests in physical education.

--those who enter the special military institutes of learning take entrance examinations in Russian language and literature (written) and mathematics.

Conscripts who have been awarded USSR medals and orders for their bravery in battle in defense of the Soviet Union and in fulfillment of international tasks are accepted at the staff colleges without entrance examinations.

In addition to the above-mentioned persons, those young men who have graduated from high school with a gold medal or from a special secondary school with honors are accepted without examinations at special air force institutions of learning.

Moreover, young men and conscripts who have completed the first or subsequent courses in an appropriate specialty at an institute or college are accepted without examinations at staff colleges and special air force educational institutes. If the chosen specialty at the institute or college does not correspond to the specialty at the military school, the candidates take examinations in general subjects. The republic's acceptance committee makes the corresponding decision.

Outside competition, individuals are accepted who have graduated from high school with a gold medal or from a special secondary school with honors and who pass the examination in basic subjects with a grade of "very good."

On the basis of competition, candidates are accepted for openings which are left over after all the foregoing. The candidates' sociopolitical activity, their moral qualities, state of health, psychological prerequisites, and level of physical preparation and general knowledge are taken into account at that time.

The republic's acceptance committee works from 5 July to 25 July. Candidates are sent to the acceptance committee by the military commissariats of the cities and rayons.

All candidates who have come to the acceptance committee are assured--and receive--room and board free of charge.

Each applicant can obtain further information from the local military commissariat of the rayon or city.

12327

CSO: 1815/31

MILITARY HISTORY

REVIEW: MEMOIRS OF LT GEN CHEREPANOV

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 85 p 2

[Review by Hero of the Soviet Union, Lt Gen (Ret) V. Shatilov of Book "Pole ratnoye moye. Voyennyye memuary" (My Battlefield: Military Memoirs) by A. Cherepanov, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1984, 304 pages]

[Text] The Purpose of Life is to Defend the Homeland

The name of this book's author is closely linked with the Soviet Army, in which he served from the day of its inception. It developed before his eyes and with his active participation. I refer to Lieutenant General A. Cherepanov and his book "Pole ratnoye moye," recently published at Voenizdat. As the author rightly points out, life did not deprive him of either joys or troubles. He wore the military uniform slightly less than 70 years. His life was so replete with events that they could be used for studying important landmarks in our homeland's history. And the Great October Socialist Revolution was the first such outstanding event to become an organic part of the author's life, as it did the lives of many of his contemporaries. A. Cherepanov was on the side of Soviet power from the very first days of the revolution.

As commander of the 2nd Red Army Regiment, Cherepanov accepted battle at Pskov in February 1918 with German forces which had switched to an offensive against the young Soviet Republic. The enemy was threatening Petrograd, citadel of the socialist revolution. Together with other units of the emerging Red Army, the regiment steadfastly repelled the enemy attacks. The German interventionists were dealt a fitting rebuff on the Pskov lines. They were also halted at Narva.

A. Cherepanov's account of the first battles fought by the 2nd Red Army Regiment, which opposed the young Soviet Republic's enemies together with other units at the order of the Soviet command, is precious to us as the statement of an eye witness and participant in the events. He resurrects the unforgettable days of revolutionary battles in our minds and helps us to appreciate the feat achieved by people who selflessly came to the defense of the cause of October. The author provides numerous interesting details and clearly and convincingly conveys the tense situation of those days, the fighting mood of those defending the revolutionary gains, the valor and courage of the Red Army men who fought the enemy.

A. Cherepanov cites the following incident. Machine-gun company commander Pakhomov demonstrated initiative and cleverness in the battle for the community

of Kresty. He proposed springing onto the road on which the enemy was traveling and firing at the enemy with a sled-mounted machine gun. The results exceeded all expectations. The enemy suffered extensive losses, and its ranks intermingled. Pakhomov's action made it possible to hold up the enemy and permitted the regiment to occupy and fortify a new position.

The reader will also find much useful information in the pages of the book dealing with the battles fought with Yudenich and with the White Poles. The author tells about his meetings and his joint combat work with Ya. Fabritsius, A. Kork, Ya Berzin and other prominent revolutionaries and military chiefs. Then the civil war ended. A time of peaceful combat training, rearmament and mastery of new equipment set in for the Soviet Army. And A. Cherepanov entered the General Staff Military Academy. In the spring of 1923 his life took an abrupt turn. He was appointed military advisor to China. The author provides a substantive account of the assistance provided the Chinese people by the Soviet military advisors in the strengthening and training of the army, of the contribution which the Chinese communists made to that work. The storming of the Weizhou Fortress and the feat accomplished by the regimental commander Colonel Liu are especially exciting. "The Weizhou Fortress," the author writes, "was essentially taken by the communists, whose will proved to be stronger than the impregnable walls. And Liu, our friend and comrade in combat, was one of the bravest among the attackers."

The author saw the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in Moscow as senior instructor of operational art at the General Staff Military Academy. He was soon at the front. He served as chief inspector under the commander in chief of the northwest axis and then as commander of the 23th Army at Leningrad. During that difficult period, A. Cherepanov had to spend a great deal of time in the forces, to personally analyze the situation and take urgent steps to halt and drive back the enemy. His memoirs contain many instructive things which could be adopted even today. The author does not downplay the difficulties surrounding the blockade of Leningrad. When he discusses them, however, he emphasizes the high level of awareness and the ideological maturity of fighters and commanders, and the role of party-political work in maintaining the morale of the troops and motivating them to route the enemy.

A. Cherepanov tells in detail about the time he spent in Bulgaria as deputy chairman of the Allied Control Commission, about his meetings with Bulgarian comrades and about the extensive assistance and support which the Soviet Union gave the Bulgarian people at a difficult hour.

The author of "Pole ratnoye moye" has lived a long and full life. And I can say with confidence that his memoirs will be of great benefit to the inquiring and inquisitive reader who ponders the meaning of life and his place in it and seeks precise reference points. And this is precisely what A. Cherepanov wanted, when he set about writing the book.

11499
CSO: 1801/196

MILITARY HISTORY

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA ON HEADQUARTERS OF SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

[PM301529 Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 April 1985 First Edition carries on page 5 a full-page feature under the heading "Supreme High Command General Headquarters" prepared by Anatoliy Khorobrykh in response to "numerous requests from readers to describe the Supreme High Command General Headquarters." Fortunately, Khorobrykh says, "rising generations have inherited the reminiscences of several members of the general headquarters and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War. It is extracts from these that have been used in preparing this feature. In organizing them into a specific sequence we proceeded from readers' questions."

In response to a question about when the Supreme High Command General Headquarters was created and who were its members, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevskiy are quoted as stating that throughout the 4 years of its operation it was headed by I.V. Stalin.

After several quotations about the sessions of the Supreme High Command General Headquarters, the feature turns to the way in which decisions on particular strategic questions were taken and cites Artillery Marshal N.D. Yakovlev who notes that "usually particular matters were worked out through the exchange of opinions" and that "sometimes a draft resolution would be written to Stalin's dictation, right there in his office...."

The feature goes on to cite reminiscences relating to the General Headquarters' relations with the front commanders and in particular quotes I.G. Bagramyan's recollections of the Baltic Front in 1944 and his suggestion to the front commander, Sokolovskiy, that they should consult with Stalin concerning their proposed shift to the defensive:

"Vasilii Danilovich agreed that the troops needed a breather but did not advise turning to Stalin: Moscow is as familiar with the situation on the fronts as we are, he said.

"When I nonetheless did telephone the general headquarters, the supreme commander heard my report on the situation and my arguments in favor of halting the offensive as he always did--attentively and without interruptions--and then, after a minute's silence, asked:

"What does the Western Front think about it?"

"I reported the opinion of General Sokolovskiy, who believed that the general headquarters would reach the same decision without our asking.

"Good, let's think about it," I.V. Stalin said, and said good-bye.

"On 2 April it was reported from the general staff that a directive had been signed on moving all troops of the first Baltic Front to the defensive...."

The feature then quotes recollections of Stalin's work style:

"A.M. Vasilevskiy: 'A component part of I.V. Stalin's work style as supreme high commander was his high degree of exactingness. Here it was not merely tough, which was in fact justifiable, especially under wartime conditions. He never forgave imprecision in work or the inability to see something through to the end, even if the culprit was a very necessary comrade without a single previous criticism levelled against him.'

"G.K. Zhukov: 'I.V. Stalin's day was somewhat unusually organized. He worked mainly in the evening and at night. Adapting to I.V. Stalin's schedule, the party central committee, soviet of people's commissars, people's commissariats, and the main state and planning organs worked late into the night. This greatly exhausted people.'"

The feature also quotes S.M. Shtemenko: "I.V. Stalin set up a 24-hour work schedule for the general staff and personally regulated the time of its leading personnel."

The feature then asks: "Were there differences in the Supreme High Command General Headquarters in resolving strategic questions?" And cites T.S.G. Kuznetsov, who is quoted as saying that Stalin disagreed with his view that it would be wrong to bring in a large new assault force to Novorossiysk in February 1943. Only after Zhukov had supported this view, Kuznetsov says, did Stalin agree that it would be inexpedient to move such a large number of troops. The feature quotes A.M. Vasilevskiy: "The turning point in Stalin's in-depth reshaping as supreme high commander was September 1942, when a very alarming situation had taken shape and the flexible, skilled leadership of military operations was particularly necessary. It was then that he began to treat the general staff apparatus and the front commanders differently... and to rely on the military leaders' collective experience."

A.I. Yeremenko's reminiscences of a meeting with Stalin at the Kalinin Front during which he gave Stalin a "detailed description" of the situation, are also cited.

Finally, in response to the question "What ensured the high degree of efficiency of the general headquarters' decisions?" the feature cites G.K. Zhukov's view that "The Supreme High Command General Headquarters was a

collective organ for the leadership of the armed forces' military operations. It was based on a sensible combination of collegiality and one-man leadership...."

The feature also includes a brief chronicle of "The Red [Red?] Army's main strategic operations" in World War II.

CSO: 1801/223

MILITARY HISTORY

BRIEFS

PACT MEETING COMMUNIQUE DISTRIBUTED--New York May 9 TASS--A communique on the meeting of top party leaders and statesmen of the Warsaw treaty members' states has been distributed as an official document of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. In the document it is noted that having met on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the end of the second world war, the most destructive and bloodiest in mankind's history, the participants in the meeting noted the great significance of the victory of the freedom-loving peoples over fascism. A high price was paid for the victory. The Soviet people who made the decisive contribution to the rout of fascism, the peoples of other countries gave tens of millions lives for its sake. The memory of the fallen, the duty to those living and the coming generations calls for lessons of the war not to be forgotten. The present-day international situation, the document stresses, the unity of effort is needed more than ever before on the part of all peoples and states, all peace forces irrespective of their political orientation in order to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT 9 May 85]

CSO: 1812/238

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

'U.S. LIES' ON USSR PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA

LD230421 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0330 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] Moscow, 23 Apr (TASS)--PRAVDA publishes under the title "Laying One's Own Fault at Another's Door" a signed rejoinder on Washington's unsubstantiated and absurd fabrications about the alleged discovery of "Russian servicemen" in the north of Nicaragua in the zone of battles between the Sandinist People's Army and the Nicaraguan "contras."

To believe the White House boss, who said this in a radio address on Saturday, PRAVDA writes, the Soviet Union is engaged in nothing other than creating its own bridgehead on the American continent, in order afterwards to organize "a whole group of pro-Soviet dictatorships" and threaten the southern border of the United States.

"Resorting to such absurd fabrications," the rejoinder says, "is an attempt to disguise the real reasons for tension in Central America. For it is generally known that the original cause of the critical situation is Washington's interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region and the policy of imperialist diktat being conducted there. It is Washington itself which is arming and financing the Somoza cutthroat who are invading Nicaragua and carrying out reprisals there against the civilian populace; it is Washington which refuses to take account of the existing realities."

"However, the adventurist course of the White House is meeting with opposition, and in the United States itself, as well. So the attempt is being made to blame someone else, although it is generally known that the Soviet Union consistently seeks to strengthen peace among peoples. No one will succeed in blackening this policy of the Soviet Union."

In a comment "The Liars From Washington", KRASNAYA ZVEZDA describes the fabrications cooked up by the U.S. special services about the "presence" of Soviet servicemen in the zone of combat actions by Nicaraguan troops as "a raving piece of sensationalism unique in its impudence."

Such a provocative "canard," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes, would arouse the envy of even the Goebbels propaganda experts.

"The fabrications about the alleged presence of Soviet military experts in Nicaragua," the newspaper declares, "is a crude provocation. It is aimed at further aggravating the situation in the Central American region, and at diverting public attention from the dangerous militarist games being constantly carried out by the American military in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the Sandinist people's revolution."

CSO: 1801/223

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON IMPLICATIONS OF MX, SDI

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian, 28 Mar 85-p 3

[Article by V. Chernyshev, TASS reviewer for military matters: "They are Readyng a Nuclear First Strike"]

[Text] "We'll cover all America with a reliable antimissile shield," declare representatives of the U.S. administration in persuading Americans to put out many, many billions of dollars for the "star wars" program. "The antimissile defense system with space-based elements also will protect you," Washington says to soothe its allies as it attempts to hitch them to its "star chariot." "We will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete," declares the American president in an attempt to calm the entire alarmed world.

But a check shows that all such promises and mottos are the most genuine bluff. Washington would like to make its own (specifically its own) strategic nuclear weapons not "impotent" or "obsolete" but more powerful such that no defense of the other side "deters." In pursuing this objective, the United States does not restrict itself to developing systems which would provide it with an "antimissile shield," but simultaneously and in deep secrecy it is conducting intensive work to develop means for overcoming the PRO [antimissile defense] of a potential enemy.

According to the British newspaper OBSERVER, maneuvering warheads for strategic missiles, chaff and light-reflecting aerosols which are to be dispersed along the missiles' path of movement and confuse detection and tracking sensors of the antimissile system, devices which puzzle the enemy defense with a multitude of decoys, radar countermeasures equipment and the like are being developed within the framework of the secret "advanced strategic missile systems" program.

All this is intended to assure American missiles the opportunity to "penetrate" the antimissile "shield" if it were created in the Soviet Union. The work is not just being done in the laboratories. During recent testing of the MX missile over the Pacific, two of its ten warheads, which flew along a path different from the rest, were released within the framework of the aforementioned program. In the future it is planned to install maneuvering warheads not only on the MX, but also on the new Midgetman missiles. In the Pentagon's draft budget for FY 1986 appropriations for the program have been doubled in comparison with the current year—from \$98 million to \$174 million. In 1987 appropriations will reach \$216 million.

According to statements by western military experts, the very existence of such a program indicates that the "impressions of President Reagan about an ideal system which would reduce the effectiveness of nuclear weapons to naught are an illusion." But we must look truth in the eye and call things for what they are. This is not an illusion, but a deliberate deception.

While advertising and embellishing his "dream" about "star wars," the White House chief once stated heatedly that he would be ready to "share" the anti-missile defense system technology with the Soviet Union. Now, however, the president prefers not to recall this. People in Western Europe now say frankly that since the United States is working to develop means for overcoming an antimissile defense, that means Washington never had that intent. Again they are only empty words.

In practice, however, the affairs of the U.S. administration indicate one thing--preparation of an opportunity for delivering a nuclear first strike. While talking profusely about "defense," official Washington is carrying out a qualitative and quantitative build-up in strategic nuclear arms, carrying on work in the area of a wide-scale antimissile defense system, and developing means for overcoming a similar antimissile defense of a potential enemy. The desires and hopes are clear--after overcoming the other side's defense, to inflict a disarming nuclear strike on it and win a nuclear war by at least partially repelling an already weakened retaliatory strike against its own territory.

These hopes are really illusory. Development of an antimissile defense will lead only to an expansion of the arms race according to the law that "action generates reaction," to an abrupt disturbance of strategic stability, to an increase in the threat of nuclear war, and to a decrease in security both of the United States and of its allies.

6904

CSO: 1801/192

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

YE. ALEKSANDROV ON JAPANESE DEFENSE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Col Ye. Aleksandrov: "They're Sharpening the Samurai Sword"]

[Text] The Soviet people celebrate the 40th anniversary of victory over fascist Germany on 9 May. This same year will be 40 years since militarist Japan was defeated. An opportunity thus appeared for the Japanese people to lead the country along a new nonmilitarist path. Unfortunately, however, those forces were found in Japan which at first little by little and then openly began restoring the armor of Japanese samurais of World War II times which were discarded on the dump of history. As early as 1950, for example, the Japanese Army began to revive in violation of Article 9 of the country's constitution at the initiative of champions of militarism and with the approval of Gen D. MacArthur, CIC of the American occupation forces in Japan. At that time it was called a "reserve police corps" with a strength of 75,000. But it was in this manner that the Japanese government took the first step to "take out the jagged samurai sword," and then begin sharpening it, slowly at first and then faster and faster as it turned the stones of the military machine. By 1954 the "reserve police corps" already had been reorganized as the "self-defense forces," which numbered 160,000 servicemen in two years.

The sword point became sharper and sharper over the years and at the present time it has been transformed into a weapon on which countries neighboring on Japan look with understandable apprehension. The strength of the three branches of the "self-defense forces" has reached 245,000. According to estimates of U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, who published his article in the American weekly "Family Weekly," there are 13 army divisions just under the colors of the ground "self-defense forces." And if we consider the principle by which the Japanese "self-defense forces" are manned (which consists of having over half the servicemen be officers or NCO's) then, if it wished, the national defense command can place an army of 1½ million under arms, in the opinion of western military specialists.

With respect to technical outfitting, the modern-day samurais of the Land of the Rising Sun have taken their "self-defense forces" to sixth place among armies of the leading capitalist states in this indicator, actually having transformed them into regular armed forces. For example, the ground forces have some 1,000 tanks, 500 self-propelled artillery pieces, 600 armored personnel carriers, and almost 4,000 guns and mortars in the inventory. To better

comprehend the true meaning of these figures it is sufficient to compare them with indicators characterizing the Japanese Army in August 1945, when Japan's war machine had reached its peak. At that time the enemy's million-man grouping near the borders with the Soviet Union (the bulk of Japan's armed forces) had 1,215 tanks and 6,640 guns and mortars.

As is apparent from the comparison, the present Japanese leadership didn't have to go very far to approach the "record achievements" of their predecessors in arithmetic indicators. But if we take the qualitative aspect (the firepower of modern weapons), the Japanese militarists have gone far ahead today.

Let's turn to the facts. In Fiscal Year 1985 Japan's military budget is to increase 6.9 percent and comprise 3,137,100,000,000 yen (\$12.55 billion). These funds will go to pay for the new Patriot air defense system being adopted in place of the old Nike missiles and for acquiring 14 F-15 fighters, 10 P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft, 3 destroyers and other combat equipment. Leaders of the military department did not fail to come out with assurances that the proposed sum would not go beyond one percent of the gross national product as required by previously adopted decisions. But what clearance was left? It turned out that it was only 0.003 percent.

Political observers note that Japan's military department especially unfolded, as the saying goes, since Y. Nakasone assumed the post of the country's prime minister. The militaristic circles of other countries of the imperialist world might envy such a protector of the military. The "concerns" of today's samurai are close and understandable to him as to no one else. The fact is that as a naval officer during World War II Nakasone understood all their wisdoms. It is not surprising that a call to turn the Land of the Rising Sun into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the Pentagon came specifically from his lips.

Nakasone is a protege of those militaristic circles for whom only one alternative exists: either arm or be ruined. This is Japan's all-powerful military-industrial complex. According to foreign press data, some 2,500 major Japanese companies work in the sphere of arms production at the present time. This list is filling out each year. And what does it mean to refuse military orders, for example, for the 20 leading giants such as Mitsubishi, Nihondenki, Kawasaki, Ishikawajima-Harima, Toshiba, Hitachi and others? The fact is that they account for some 80 percent of the military department's orders, which last year cost a total of 1.2 trillion yen.

The moneybags heading these industrial giants aren't troubled by the fact that death is being forged in the shops of their enterprises. Reasoning that the money doesn't smell, they continue to build up military production. As indicated by data of the weekly SHUKAN BUNSHUN, in the last 25 years alone the volume of industrial production connected with military business rose 30 times and continues to increase at twice the rate as in Western Europe. Such figures naturally give rise to gloomy forecasts. K. Tomiyama, a professor at Kanto Gakuin University, figured that by the end of the present decade Japan already can take one of the first places in the world in absolute military expenditures.

At the same time, an active "militaristic development" of the Japanese Islands by the United States is going on. It was begun back in 1951, when the so-called "security treaty" was signed. Years passed, and a genuine militaristic alliance developed on its basis. It is generally known that under pressure from Washington the Land of the Rising Sun assumed the obligation of "protecting" sea lanes at a distance of 1,000 nm from Japanese shores. Over the last decades the Japanese Islands have been filled like a pie with American nuclear weapons. American aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear weapons aboard act as if at home in the Japanese ports. Battles unfold on the Japanese land and in coastal waters in which the Americans rehearse the accomplishment of their odious schemes, wherein the Japanese Armed Forces have been given the role of an active accomplice.

And so the samurai sword is again being sharpened at the initiative of the Japanese militarists and with the help of the Pentagon's hawks. It may be raised again over the Asiatic peoples.

6904

CSO: 1801/192

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

REVIEW: 'THE GEOGRAPHY OF MILITARISM', (1984)

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 85 p 3

[Review by S. Osokin, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Geografiya militarizma" [The Geography of Militarism] by a group of authors, "Mysl'", 1984, 269 pages]

[Text] That was the title under which Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'" published a book written by prominent Soviet military historians, economists and geographers. It provides a comprehensive military-political description of militarism, its sources, its ideological and political essence, features, and forms of manifestation in different periods of history and in different countries. Contemporary militarism is examined as a subject of study of political and military geography.

The book consists of nine chapters, an introduction and an appendix. It opens with a chapter which analyzes the sources of militarism. Information is given here to the effect that the people of our planet have experienced 14,550 large and small wars over the last 5,566 years, in which 3,640,500,000 persons died. Values worth over \$115.13 quintillion were demolished or destroyed in these wars. These means would have been sufficient to provide the present-day population of the planet with everything necessary for several thousand years.

The second chapter studies the essence and characteristic features of modern militarism. It shows how the center of militarism shifted from Europe to the United States in postwar times. The U.S. monopolistic bourgeoisie became the principal bulwark of international reaction. American imperialism enmeshed the world with military-political blocs. The United States is connected with more than 40 countries by bilateral treaties for so-called "mutual defense."

The book devotes considerable attention to a study of the American Army. The U.S. Armed Forces are divided into five elements according to specific operational-strategic purpose: strategic offensive forces, general purpose forces, strategic defensive forces, forces and assets for strategic movements, and strategic reserves (first order). The strategic offensive forces make up the foundation of the U.S. military might and nuclear potential. They can send up 10,000 nuclear warheads in a single launch.

The book also devotes a great deal of space to a study of militarism in other NATO countries. Vast factual material is used to show how the United States

and its partners in this bloc turned Europe into one of the centers of military danger. An enormous amount of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, as well as large armies and navies outfitted with the latest combat equipment are concentrated here.

With respect to the features of militarism in Japan, the authors show that, in contrast to other imperialist states, it bears a hidden, camouflaged nature to a certain extent. At the same time, the book emphasizes that the Japanese leadership is leaning more and more toward building up the military potential, it is activating militaristic tendencies, and it is joining with the global strategy of confrontation imposed by Washington.

Imperialism makes wide use of international zionism as one of the shock detachments for attacking socialism, the national liberation movement and the forces of peace and social progress. Israel's zionist leadership acts as the principal conductor and spokesman for the interests of international reaction in the Near East. The work's examination of the history and geography of Israeli militarism is interesting in this regard. The information about zionism's militaristic essence, Israel's Armed Forces and military-industrial potential, and the militaristic propaganda of its rulers will be useful for the military reader.

The authors analyze militarism's development in a number of countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The chapter "Militarism and Ecology" is of considerable interest. It cites and analyzes many facts permitting the conclusion: "Militarism is a mortal threat both to present and future generations. Imperialists resort to the most monstrous atrocities, barbarism and genocide to preserve their domination, to exploit and oppress the workers and to subjugate other peoples."

There is no doubt that the book will generate great interest in a wide range of readers and will help them study the military-political situation in various regions of the world.

6904

CSO: 1801/192

AFGHANISTAN

JPRS-UMA-85-037
13 June 1985

MEETINGS OF AFGHAN 'COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES' IN IRAN NOTED

NC300857 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1400 GMT 29 Apr 85

[From "The World Today" feature]

[Text] Afghan counterrevolutionaries met recently in Tehran, Mashhad, and Esfahan with the consent of Iranian officials. Our commentator, Igor Sheftunov, writes:

These meetings coincided with the anniversary of the victory of the anti-feudal, popular revolution, which was celebrated by the Afghan people on 27 April. Although 7 years have passed since the revolution, the imperialists and reactionaries have not been able to come to terms with it.

As reported by the IRANIAN NEWS AGENCY, leaders of three anti-Afghan groups delivered speeches in Mashhad recently rejecting the changes in Afghanistan and stating they will continue their fight against the current Afghan government. Why are the reactionaries so angry?

As you know, the April Revolution confiscated the property of some 40,000 Afghan landlords who owned three-fourths of Afghanistan's cultivable land and pitilessly exploited millions of farmers. Their land now belongs to those who till it. More than 300,000 Afghan families have received land. The revolution also rescued 11 million Afghans from debts to moneylenders, landlords, and large merchants. Most of these exploiters fled the country after the revolution and settled in Iran and Pakistan. They have been waging an undeclared war against the Afghan people with support from imperialists and regional reactionaries for 7 years.

Afghanistan's workers have given a decisive answer to the counterrevolutionaries. They are successfully building a new life and are improving the national economy. Last year, for instance, industrial output increased by about 5 percent. The agricultural sector was able to meet the country's need for staples. The Afghan government increased wages twice and kept prices stable. All this has had a favorable impact on the people's lives, and the standard of living is rising continuously.

The recent meeting of the Loya Jergeh, Afghanistan's supreme council, was an important event in that country's life. Some 2,000 representatives of tribal elders and of villages, towns, provinces, and cities approved documents which

unanimously support Democratic Afghanistan's domestic and foreign policies. They also called on the governments of Iran and Pakistan to stop interfering in Afghanistan's domestic affairs and to help ensure regional peace and security through direct talks with the Afghan government. The Supreme Council also asked those who have been deceived and who have sided with the enemies of the Afghan people and revolution to lay down their arms and to begin a peaceful life on the basis of the Afghan government's general amnesty.

Democratic Afghanistan's policy and the Supreme Council's decisions do more than satisfy the wishes of those Afghans who have been deceived and are being kept in Iran by force. They also fulfill the aspirations of the Iranian people, whose interest lies in an end to the undeclared war on neighboring Afghanistan, which is one more war for the Iranian people.

The trend toward normalizing relations with its eastern neighbor is growing in Iran. This is a cause for further concern among Afghan counterrevolutionaries and their mentors in Iran and the imperialist countries. This is why we recently saw the commotion of conferences in Tehran, Mashhad, and Esfahan, which sought to villify Democratic Afghanistan, its government, and its people.

CSO: 4640/582

AFGHANISTAN.

JPRS-UMA-85-037

13 June 1985

COMMENTARY VIEWS DRA-IRANIAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

NC161139 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1700 GMT 15 May 85

[Commentary by Vera Lebedeva]

[Text] Dear friends, 5 years ago on 14 May 1980 the DRA government published a program outlining a political solution to the problems faced by Afghanistan. This program was complemented by the 24 August 1981 publication of the DRA government's statement.

It should be pointed out that exacerbation of the tension in Afghanistan stems from intervention, particularly military intervention, by the forces of imperialism and reaction in this country's affairs. It also originates from these forces' efforts to obstruct Afghan workers from constructing a new life free from exploitation and from carrying out the duties stipulated by the national democratic revolution. To achieve this goal, U.S. imperialism and regional reaction initiated and continued to wage an undeclared war against Afghanistan. This war is being fought by treacherous hirelings described by Western mass media as strugglers for Islam. However, Afghans themselves have correctly described these imperialist hirelings as enemies and rebels. After completing a special course in either Pakistan or Iran under the supervision of CIA or Mossad instructors, these rebels secretly infiltrate into Democratic Afghanistan's territory where they commit their crimes and set fire to people's property, homes, and crops. The insurgents have destroyed more than 600 mosques in Afghanistan, and they have burned thousands of copies of the Koran and other Islamic books. These insurgents are to blame for the blood shed by numerous innocent victims, including Muslim clergymen.

The people and government of the DRA naturally grant top priority to ending this undeclared war. In the statements of 14 May 1980 and 24 August 1981, the Afghan government proposed the beginning of talks with neighboring Pakistan and Iran in a bid to end the undeclared war and grant international guarantees preventing its resumption. Needless to say, Democratic Afghanistanis prepared to participate in both bipartite and tripartite talks. Only matters pertaining to foreign policy should be discussed during these talks. Three rounds of indirect talks were held in 1982, 1983, and 1984 between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unfortunately, these sessions did not achieve favorable results. It should be noted, however, that the very fact of Afghan-Pakistani talks created worries in Washington, which does not favor a political solution to the

problem but seeks instead to continue military operations against the DRA. As for Iran, this country refused to participate in talks proposed by the government of Democratic Afghanistan.

If the undeclared war is stopped and guaranteed not to be resumed, then the situation around Afghanistan will change for the better. The reasons which prompted the Soviet Union to station limited military units in Afghanistan--at the request of the Afghan government and for the purpose of defending that country from foreign aggression--will be removed. The leaders of both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan have pointed this out on several occasions. In his speech on 10 January of this year, for instance, Babrak Karmal stated that the signing of agreements between the DRA, Pakistan, and Iran on the establishment of normal relations, nonaggression, nonintervention in each other's domestic affairs, which should be accompanied by trustworthy international guarantees, and the return of fugitives will create the necessary foundations for solving questions pertaining to the presence of limited Soviet units in Afghanistan. The materialization and careful observation of these agreements as they relate to each other will ensure a genuine political solution to all aspects of the issue. Babrak Karmal pointed out that holding direct talks between the DRA, Pakistan, and Iran will be the most important step toward achieving this objective.

It is clear that the withdrawal of the limited Soviet troops from Afghanistan can only take place as the final stage in the solution to the problems of Afghanistan. To withdraw these troops first, as some in Iran have proposed, is impossible for it will mean that the Afghan people will be left alone vis-a-vis a sly enemy armed to the teeth. This will be tantamount to assisting the efforts of imperialists to stifle Afghanistan's revolution and reestablish the former feudal system there.

The DRA's proposals to Pakistan and Iran continue to remain in force. These proposals aim at achieving a peaceful solution to problems. Like the Afghan government's entire peace-seeking foreign policy, they are respected and endorsed throughout the world. So far 70 countries have recognized the DRA. Some 15 specialized UN agencies are participating in programs for the development and progress of Democratic Afghanistan. The DRA has been a member of the Nonaligned Movement's Coordination Office since 1973. Therefore, efforts by the United States and its associates to isolate the DRA on the international scene are futile. Any attempt to talk with the DRA from a position of force is also useless. There is only one path, and that is the path of negotiations, the path of a political solution to problems.

CSO: 4640/582

AFGHANISTAN

JPRS-UMA-85-037
13 June 1985

TASS STATEMENT ON SOVIET SOLDIERS' DEATHS NOTED

TA151737 Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan 1500 GMT 15 May 85

[Text] Dear listeners, we draw your attention to a report by TASS, the official news agency of the Soviet Union, on an incident that took place some time ago around Peshawar in one of the subversive and terrorist training centers of the Afghan counterrevolution on Pakistan's soil.

The rebels there secretly transferred to Pakistan a group of Soviet and Afghan military personnel whom they had captured in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and imprisoned them there. It is evident that they intended, through intense torture, severe beatings and insults, to induce them to betray their homeland, but they did not succeed. The prisoners resisted with courage and honor, and always endeavored to meet representatives of the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad or be handed over to the Pakistani government.

Pakistani government officials refrained from carrying out this lawful request. At this point the Soviet and Afghan military personnel tried to free themselves with the aid of arms. They succeeded in disarming the guards by taking advantage of the opportunity, and seized the ammunition and arms depot which was in that same training center. They again requested to meet representatives of government authorities, but instead groups of Afghan rebels and units of the Pakistani army's regular forces, supported by artillery, were sent against them. A fierce battle broke out. The brave combatants, using the weapons which they had taken as booty from the rebels, killed hundreds of the enemies and Pakistani soldiers, but the forces were extremely unequal. The Soviet and Afghan military personnel lost their lives bravely on the field of battle. They were martyred but they did not surrender.

(?General Fazlhaq), the military governor of Pakistan's northwestern border province, hastily came to the camp and tried to do everything in order to conceal this crime. He ordered one of the gangleaders of Afghan counterrevolutionary bands to announce that allegedly a military clash had taken place between two rival groups within the band, but it was not possible to hide the truth. At the beginning of May some news agencies, quoting their correspondents in Islamabad, issued a number of reports about this incident. The crime around Peshawar is evidence of Islamabad's direct interference in Afghan affairs and its involvement in the disgraceful acts of the counterrevolutionaries.

The main channels for the supply of various modern foreign-made weapons and armaments for the rebel bands are precisely connected in Pakistan. Over 100 training centers in Pakistan, under the leadership of foreign instructors--mainly American--implement a precisely drawn up program for the training of mercenaries with the aim of waging an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan. Counterrevolutionary bands are set up under the supervision and with the participation of representatives of local Pakistani authorities. Pakistan itself also carries out [words indistinct] against Afghanistan, and brings under fire its residential areas in the border regions. All these deeds are a flagrant violation of the most elementary international laws.

On 11 May the Soviet Union's ambassador in Islamabad handed Ziaul Haq, Pakistan's president, a strong protest in connection with the death of Soviet military personnel on Pakistani soil. In the protest note it was requested that the culprits be punished, noting that the Soviet side places all responsibility on the Pakistani government and expects that the government of Pakistan will draw the necessary conclusion in connection with the consequences of its collaboration in aggression against Afghanistan and the measures against the Soviet Union.

CSO: 4665/86

AFGHANISTAN

JPRS-UMA-85-037
13 June 1985

MOSCOW TV NOTES USE OF PAKISTAN FOR ACTION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN

LD152000 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1445 GMT 15 May 85

[From the "World Today" program presented by Vsevolod Shishkovskiy]

[Excerpts] According to a report by PTI, talks have begun between the United States and Pakistan on concluding the latest military-political deal totaling \$6 billion. It envisages a further increase in Pakistan's military might through mass supplies of modern American weapons. New attempts to involve Pakistan even more deeply into the orbit of U.S. militarist strategy in South Asia are thus evident. [passage omitted citing TIMES OF INDIA on use of bases in Pakistan by Washington]

It is no secret that with Washington's aid, Pakistan has turned into a bridgehead from which the enemies of the Afghan revolution continue their criminal attacks. It is precisely in Pakistan that the main supply channels for the dushmans of modern weapons and combat technology of foreign manufacture come together. Here there are more than 100 training centers. Under the management of foreign and mainly American instructors, there operates a thoroughly worked out system for training mercenaries to wage undeclared war against Afghanistan. Bands of counterrevolutionaries are formed under the supervision of and with the participation of representatives of local authorities of Pakistan. Subdivisions of the Pakistan Army and police participate in their training, equipping and dispatch into Afghanistan. Pakistan not only protects the dushmans, but itself carries out military provocations against Afghanistan, shelling its populated areas in border areas. All these and other gross violations of elementary norms of international law were firmly pointed out in a note of protest presented a few days ago by the Soviet ambassador in Islamabad to the President Ziaul Haq of Pakistan. The document stresses that the Soviet side expects the Pakistan Government to make the appropriate conclusions concerning the consequences with which its participation in aggression against the DRA and actions against the Soviet Union are fraught. [video shows men walking over rough terrain, over snow, sitting on ground with weapons, being trained]

AFGHANISTAN

JPRS-UMA-85-037
13 June 1985

IZVESTIYA ON REBEL GROUP'S CONVERSION

PM071010 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by correspondent G. Ustinov "Letter from Kabul": "Before It Is Too Late"]

[Text] They drove to Kabul in four trucks, and throughout the 50 km journey they were beside themselves with joy. They roared with laughter, joked, sang raucous songs, and danced about wildly, totally unconcerned that they might fall out of the truck while it was moving. In their native village of (Bekh-Zadi), each lad left behind his house, his field, his orchard, and all his peasant's belongings, grabbing only the bare essentials for the trip to the capital. But there was happiness in the women's and children's eyes as they looked at their husbands and fathers.

Arriving at their destination toward evening, they reported to the Kabul Province KHAD (security organs) Administration. All 28 men leaped out of the trucks and in rows of four marched briskly into a yard between low, square buildings. Here they dropped their weapons on the ground, took off their ammunition pouches, unfastened the grenades they had clipped to their belts, and followed (Zalmay), their leader, in single file to the office of the head of the administration, where they were already expected.

They did not stay long. They had signed the document on their surrender 3 days earlier in their district of Shekari, Darreh-ye. The serious discussion about these people's future would take some time, and it was getting dark outside. So they got into their vehicles again and dispersed to various parts of the city to stay with relatives or friends. No one accompanied them, no one followed them. The authorities knew that the decision of the group from (Bekh-Zadi) to side with the republic had been serious, irreversible, and based on the complete conviction of the correctness of this step. "Before it is too late," (Zalmay) had said at the district party committee, putting his signature to the statement. This was why they had brought their families to Kabul with them.

The next day I was allowed to meet them. I spent several hours in unhurried, frank conversation with (Zalmay). My interlocutor kept nothing back and gave detailed answers to the questions I put to him.

(Zalmay Kundel), just like all the members of his detachment, is an ordinary peasant. He is 33 and married. He has two sons and two daughters. He left no great riches at (Bekh-Zadi): a mud house and a small piece of land. And the others were no big landowners' sons either. All their lives they had toiled on the land from dawn to dusk. Most of them are illiterate. He alone managed 5 years in the village school.

Was not the April revolution staged for people like themselves? Were not its main concerns--to distribute the feudal lords' fat lands among the poor, grant ordinary workers full civil rights, and teach the illiterate how to read and write--aimed at people like themselves?

The revolution was very young, however. It could not immediately reach all districts, small population centers, and villages. And its numerous enemies--internal and external enemies, excelling in perfidy and vitally interested in ensuring that Afghanistan does not set the East the "wrong example," that everything here remains as it always was, keeping the Afghan people slavishly resigned to their fate, in ignorance and age-old backwardness--these enemies were not asleep....

"After the revolution hundreds of people whom we did not know appeared in our village," (Zalmay) says. "Pakistanis, Egyptians, Europeans, and Americans, all with a good knowledge of the Afghan languages. Together with the rich peasants in our village they tried to convince us that infidels had come to power in Kabul, that Islam was in danger in our country, that the land reform was a violation of the laws of the Sharia which proscribe the appropriation of other people's property, and that the liquidation of years of peasants' debts to money-lenders was a godless decision. Peasants are people who stick to old traditions, and many succumbed to this propaganda.

(Zalmay Kundel) at first did not understand either which way the wind was blowing. In 1980, together with two brothers and four nephews, he joined a gang that was being organized in Shekari, Darreh-ye District by the notorious criminal (Khadzhi-Baba), who had previously engaged in drug trafficking. (Khadji) appointed (Zalmay) group leader, issued him with a few rifles, and sent him back to (Bekh-Zadi). "It is your job to see to it that not a single bag of wheat, not a single cart of wood leaves the village of Kabul. No assistance to the government!"

The task was very appropriate. (Bekh-Zadi) had always supplied agricultural products and fuel to the capital. And there were 20 such villages in the district.... And when, perplexed, people asked what would happen to the fruits of their labor, (Khadji-Baba) reassured them: "We will buy everything. The Mujahidin detachment will grow and will need much food. Our foreign friends will give us the money for the food."

The district dushman chief gathered a gang of some 250 people, mainly ignorant, illiterate peasants who had the scantiest notion of what was actually happening in the country. There were cases when local inhabitants said: "You can kill me, rather than make me fight." And (Khadji-Baba) did not hesitate. He referred to his detachment as "batallion" and held military exercises twice a week.

During his frequent trips to Pakistan he was looking for a patron among the Afghan counterrevolutionary leaders entrenched there, trying to find the most influential among them, likely to receive the most generous financial support from world reaction. Changing "parties" several times, he finally settled on the "Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan." (Sayyaf), chairman of the alliance and a former professor of theology, did indeed receive particularly big sums of money from Western special services and various "solidarity funds" in countries hostile to revolutionary Afghanistan. The lion's share of this money found its way into the pockets of the Islamic Alliance leaders, but considerable sums also went to the ringleaders of the dushman gangs for waging the "holy war."

"Everything that (Khadji-Baba) managed to scrounge in Peshawar he kept for himself," (Zalmay) recounts. "I know that other dushman ringleaders acted likewise. There could be no mention of a square deal for the peasants. As soon as fall arrived they took half the farmers' harvest on the pretext that this was "a voluntary contribution to the common cause."

Peasants are not rich people, yet (Khadji-Baba's) greed and graspingness grew by the minute. Then (Khadji-Baba) took up outright robbery on the highways. He captured trucks which had fallen behind motorized columns carrying state freight, attacked trade caravans, and did not shrink from fleecing passengers on regular inter-city buses. In Kabul he had a number of dealers loyal to him who sold the stolen goods in their shops.

"I am ashamed to admit that my detachment also had to take part in this dirty business," (Zalmay) says. "There was no doubt in our minds: (Khadji's) actions went not only against our faith but also against the very nature of the Afghan workers, brought up for centuries in the traditions of profound honesty. But what were we to do? Brutal, medieval discipline reigned in (Khadji's) gang, maintained by means of threats and swift retribution against those who failed to obey and against their families. While taking an indulgent view of the way (Khadji) was lining his pockets his Peshawar patron nonetheless demanded that the "battalion" mount active counterrevolutionary operations. Terrorists and saboteurs trained in Pakistan formed the gang's assault group, which mined roads, blew up bridges, put peasants' irrigation systems out of operation, and hunted down people who sympathized with the revolution. Mosques and progressively minded religious figures became a special target for the "fighters for the faith."

There were seven mosques in (Bekh-Zadi). "One night," (Zalmay) recounts, "the settlement was lit up by the glare of a fire. On the edge of the village dust hung in the air, churned up by a group of riders galloping off into the hills. The whole village poured out into the street. The two biggest mosques and (Bekh-Zadi's) only school--the school where I, too, had been taught--were on fire. People hurled curses after the unknown fire raiders. Next morning (Khadji) himself paid us a visit. He assured us that the crime had been committed by government people taking revenge on the peasants for supporting the 'fighters for the faith.'"

Some time later the ringleader summoned (Zalmay) and told him that his group would have to burn down two schools in neighboring villages.

"Why schools?" (Zalmay) asked.

"Don't you understand? Why should we produce educated people? It will be more difficult to convince them who has truth on his side. Do you know what the esteemed Professor (Sayyaf's) latest directive says? Only illiterate people are to be appointed leaders of our detachments, be they large or small. We do not want them to think too much...."

Luckily, (Zalmay) did not have time to carry out (Khadji's) orders. At that time the situation in the district began to change in favor of the people's power. At Shekari, Darreh-ye an organization nucleus--The PDPA District committee--was established along with the republic administration, women and youth organization cells, and Tsarandoy (militia) and KHAD posts. (Zalmay) contacted (Musakhan), chief of the security forces detachment, and told him of the sincere and ardent wish of all the members of his group to give themselves up. He was taken aback when (Musakhan) told him that a decree had been passed by the Republic Revolutionary Council granting an amnesty to all who lay down arms and voluntarily stop fighting against the revolution. Naturally, the dushman ringleaders keep the rank-and-file members of their groupings in the dark about these things.

"What are your plans for the future?" I asked.

"We are infinitely happy that we managed--before it was too late--to cast off the heavy burden of errors, fear, and guilt, the burden of leading a double life. We would like to return, only in a completely different role. We are planning to establish a strong detachment of defenders of the revolution in (Bekh-Zadi). The people's authorities have promised us every possible support. And, most important, we have the support of our fellow villagers. People are tired of the tyranny of counterrevolution, the plunder, the violence. If they see that it is possible to forcefully rebuff (Khadji's) thugs and other bandit gangs which roam the district, they will indubitably unite in a single, powerful fist."

"And it will not be possible," he added after a pause, "to keep the members of dushman detachments in darkness and ignorance forever, as (Khadji), his immediate boss (Sayyaf), and their foreign patrons would have it. Do you know what they told us during yesterday's conversation here at the headquarters? During the past 3 months alone, 30 large and small groups which fought against the revolution in the past have gone over to people's power in Kabul Province. Together with us that makes exactly 1,000 people...."

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PAPER REPORTS SOLDIERS' HELP TO AFGHANS

PMO21557 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 May 85 Second Edition p 2

[Article by special correspondent Reserve Lieutenant Colonel V. Vozovikov under the rubric "From the Afghan Notebook": "Handshake en Route"]

[Text] For the Afghan peasant, water is as precious as land itself, but it can also cause trouble. The rapidly melting snow in the mountains caused the irrigation canals to overflow, the flood of water undermined the dam, and dark tentacles began to creep towards the crops and the vineyards. The village peasants rushed out into the fields with hoes and spades. Some tried to save the dam while others unflaggingly dug a drainage ditch. The loamy soil, baked by the sun, was as hard as stone, the flood of water was mounting all the time, and it was obvious that the people's desperate efforts were in vain: it would wash away the dam and the barrage of water would surge onto the cultivated fields.

A gray-bearded elder, dropping his hoe, looked around anxiously. Not far away on a barren field he could see the camp of the Soviet military unit. Various things were said about the "shuravi" [Soviet soldiers] in the mountains, but the old peasant only believed what he himself knew. Since this unit had appeared, the extortionate requisitions of the dushmans and their violence and reprisals had stopped and the peasants had been peacefully cultivating the land received from the government. The Soviet soldiers had not harmed a single peasant. They came to the village and shared rice, flour, sugar, and bread with those in need and provided matches and salt, which are always in particular demand here. The Soviet military doctors had started surgery days for Afghans and did not accept payment for treatment. But still he was afraid of troubling the military--after all, they had enough concerns of their own.

The old man sighed and picked up his hoe, but, glancing at the field glowing gold, he suddenly imagined the muddy mire which would be left there by the flood of water.

"Mirza!" he called to a young man. "We have no choice. You speak Russian. Get on your bike and ride over to the unit. Tell them about our trouble. If they help us, we will pay them well."

Political worker Major Vladimir Isayev understood the situation as soon as they phoned him from the checkpoint and told him of the Afghan's request. And he took a decision in a flash.

"Tell the comrade: We will be with them in half an hour. Get them to try to hold back the water at any price."

Nearby an excavator was at work. Isayev hurried up to it and got into the cab next to the driver.

"Well, buddy, full speed ahead to the fields. If we delay our neighbors will not escape disaster."

It took less than half an hour for the vehicle to reach the dam. The steel teeth of the scoop pierced the hard earth and a deep ditch began to grow before their eyes. Soon the flood of water poured into the stream, transforming it into a full river. The Afghans clustered round the Soviet major and soldier, clasping their hands to their chests in thanks:

"We will not forget this."

Seeing money in the old peasant's hand, Isayev made a firm gesture.

"But there's no need for that. You offend us. We do not help friends for handouts but out of comradely duty."

"Perhaps he would take it?" the peasant looked uncertainly at a soldier. Wiping his sweaty face, the soldier began to laugh:

"Am I not a shuravi? I and the comrade major are of the same race, the Soviet race. But I would not refuse some spring water."

The peasants had already brought grapes, milk, and flat cakes. The grain fields were golden beneath the sun and the vineyards and the watermelon plantations were a vivid green. The wrinkles of worry were smoothed away from the faces of the tired people....

"If the Russians are nearby, there's nothing to fear"--these words have often been heard on Afghan soil. They were said to us too in one of the villages by (Said Mukhammad), secretary of the local Democratic Organization of Youth and son of a poor peasant. And then I recalled an incident which happened in a European country far from Afghanistan. On a city street a child got entangled in broken wires and died. There were several passers-by but none of them could bring himself to help the boy, fearing a shock from the electric current. The young mother stood stock-still over her dead son, then looked round at the crowd of people who were looking at her with compassion and curiosity. Suddenly in the silence the following bitter words could be clearly heard:

"If only there had been just one Russian here, my son would be alive."

Perhaps this woman had visited our country or met with Soviet people in her own country. Or perhaps her parents had told her about the Soviet servicemen who brought that country freedom in 1945, saved children and women from fire, fed the hungry, and gathered up the orphans and kept them warm. Whatever the case, her words spread round the city and reached our tourists.

Through the veil of the most malicious and sophisticated lies by anti-Soviets of all shades, the truth about our people and our soldiers is reaching ordinary people. The force of this truth lies in the fact that it rests on real deeds and acts by living people. Wherever the Soviet serviceman has appeared, even prejudiced people soon come to know him as a friend and protector on whom they can rely at difficult times. From the first days of its birth our army has defended the just cause of the working people, the freedom of the peoples, and life and peace on earth. And it is with this mission that Soviet servicemen arrived on Afghan soil at the request of the revolutionary DRA government, and it is the nobility of their aims which determines the nature of human acts.

The last thing Maj Isayev was thinking was that he was displaying nobility by helping the village out of trouble. He was acting as a Soviet man, following his duty and conscience. And that is how Hero of the Soviet Union Major Gennadiy Kuchkin acted when he met an Afghan column in the mountains once, held up by a minefield, the young commander was utterly dismayed. Then the Soviet Officer, a Communist, took an exceptional decision. Counting on his personal experience, he drove his armored personnel carrier through the minefield. The machine was harmed by explosion, Kuchkin and the driver were stunned, but the force of example of the Soviet servicemen urged the Afghan subunit forward. It forced its way through the minefield.

Such instances are not isolated in Afghanistan, but nonetheless they are special cases. However, even everyday life reveals the internationalist nature of our serviceman. Officer Aleksey Kozlov served at one time in the same unit as Isayev. He and his subordinates were the first Soviet people the peasants of one of the poorest villages intimidated by the dushmans had met. And less than 2 months later the village had resolutely sided with the revolution, a strong self-defense detachment came into being there, cooperatives were set up, a school opened, and the whole of life began to be transformed. The peasants remember Kozlov and his comrades with gratitude. They remember how the village was decked out in red for the first time--the peasants and the Soviet servicemen together celebrated May Day, the festival of working people's solidarity. Probably they also remember Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Kasyanov, Lieutenant Colonel Vitaliy Shevchish, Major Aleksandr Yakushev, Senior Lieutenants Sergey Danilov, Radzhab Alimov, and Norali Shabanov, and also many others who unstily shared their experience with Afghan servicemen and helped the leaders of the local PDPA organizations, cooperative workers, and teachers.

Soviet pilots and military drivers have merited the Afghans' profound gratitude and admiration. Working frequently under dushman bullets, they deliver vitally important freight to the most inaccessible regions, save people who are ill, and help out those afflicted by natural disasters. The airmen of

the subunit commanded by officer Sleksandr Serebryakov have become the patrons of the local high school and the "Motherland" refuge in which children of revolutionaries, servicemen, workers, and peasants killed by the dushmans are educated. For the young Afghans, every visit by the Soviet Subunit becomes a holiday.

We saw a poster in an Afghan Army unit: Servicemen of the two armies clasping strong hands. Of course, the poster was symbolic but it instantly reminded us of a real picture. A Soviet freight column and a column of Afghan armored carriers met at an intersection of mountain roads. It was a difficult turn, and it would take quite a time to make the turn. Officer Sergey Proskurin applied the brakes to the infantry combat vehicle leading the trucks" Perhaps the Afghans were carrying out a combat task, in which case every minute is precious. However, the friends' leading vehicle also stopped, and a thin officer with a tired face jumped down from its armor-plating, went up to Proskurin, and said:

"Go through first, comrades. We are returning from a raid and need not hurry. You are carrying grain, and people are waiting for it, so please go through."

"Thanks," Proskurin bent down from the armor-plating and shook the Afghan's hand.

The column negotiated the crossing, and even the drivers took their hand off the wheel for an instant to express with a gesture their feelings of comradeship and solidarity with their class brothers fighting for their freedom and for a better future for their people.

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BRIEFS

DRA ARMY PAPER'S ANNIVERSARY--Kabul, 6 May--The newspaper HAQIQAT-E SARBAZ (Soldiers' Truth), central organ of the DRA Ministry of National Defense, has celebrated its 5th anniversary. Addressing the festive meeting held in Kabul, Lieutenant General M. Y. Sadeqi, secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and chief of the Afghan Army Main Political Directorate, noted the newspaper's important contribution to the establishment of the DRA Armed Forces, to their mobilization in the struggle against the counter-revolution, and to ideological education work among servicemen. A greetings message to the newspaper from the PDPA Central Committee signed by B. Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council, was read at the meeting. Greetings were also delivered from the collective of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, central organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense. [TASS Report: "Newspaper's Jubilee"] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 95 First Edition p 3]

DRA'S KESHTMAND ON MILITIA--Kabul May 19 TASS--A meeting of the party activists of the Ministry of the Interior of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) has been held in the Afghan capital. Those present were addressed by Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand, member of the political bureau of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. He touched upon the tasks of ensuring security in the country, of protecting the state borders and of strengthening power in the provinces. The people's militia--"Tsarandoi", he emphasized, must be the reliable shield of the interest of the Afghan working people. The observance of democratic legality, the devotion of the ideals of the revolution, the service to the people and reliance upon them constitute the basis of the Tsarandoi activities. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1206 GMT 19 May 85]

TRUCKERS FACE DANGERS--Important national economic tasks are being successfully performed in Afghanistan with the assistance of the Soviet Union. A major contribution to the development of the Republic's economic and trade links is made by Afsotr, the Afghan-Soviet Transport and Dispatch Company. [Begin V. Fadeyev video recording; correspondent identified by caption] [passage omitted] There was a time when private transport owners who had succumbed to counterrevolutionary propaganda sabotaged goods transport, but then Afsotr drivers took most of this work upon themselves. At that time, many failed to return from their runs. Every working day for those who work here begins with an encounter with this monument to the heroism and courage of the drivers. [video shows two men walking past a towering block of hewn stone inscribed in arabic with the word "Allah"] Today, every run along the 450-km route is still accompanied by danger and risk. The jagged bullet marks on the cabin of this truck are the results of a dushman ambush. [video shows truck cab riddled with what appear to be bullet holes] Neither the intrigues of the enemies of the April revolution nor the difficult natural conditions, however, can upset the working routine of the enterprise. [passage omitted] [end recording] [From the Vremya newscast] [Excerpts] [Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 4 May 85]

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